The unanticipated victory of Donald Trump—despite the hyperbolic reactions on both sides of the Atlantic—will not change the strategic partnership between the US and Germany. On the contrary, Trump’s election presents a unique opportunity to redefine the US-German partnership as the new “special relationship” of the future. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the realm of security cooperation. Developments in Ukraine, Russia’s resurgence, and the fight against ISIL underscore the critical need for a strong, unified European security framework; however, the one country that must lead, Germany, still struggles to find its voice in security affairs. Germany has too long been haunted by its past and cannot allow the shadows of the Second World War to cloud its future calculus. Particularly in the aftermath of Brexit, Berlin’s global influence as de facto European Union leader presupposes greater military and intelligence roles on a global scale. The German Ministry of Defense’s July 2016 “White Paper,” which outlines more ambitious overtures in defense policy, is a step in the right direction.[1] Washington must build upon this foundation and elevate its alliance with Berlin to that of an enduring “special relationship,” one in which Germany emerges as America’s most significant political, economic, and security partner in Europe.
Assigning the term “special relationship” to German-US ties does not occur automatically to most in the American and European policy communities. However, both countries must now account for new geopolitical realities vice status quo arrangements. Most notably, Washington’s storied “special relationship” with the United Kingdom does not merit as significant a role as in the past. Britain’s severely reduced military budget, pending exit from the European Union, and meager roles in both anti-ISIL efforts and the Ukraine crisis, illustrate London’s diminished global influence.[2] France, although willing to employ aggressively its military forces abroad, does not possess the economic or political influence to steer singlehandedly European Union policy. Washington’s special relationship with Berlin will not only benefit bilateral relations; a Germany more engaged in global security operations is critical to the maintenance of the current international order. Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski perhaps expressed this sentiment best in 2011, stating, “I fear German power less today than German inaction.”[3]
Domestic unrest in Germany as a result of the refugee crisis underscores the German security establishment’s inability to address terrorist threats. Guido Steinberg, a terrorism expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, stated recently, “In a way, we have outsourced our counterterrorism to the US. Germans are not ready to build up their intelligence capabilities for political reasons, so this will continue.”[4] Indeed, Germany’s commitment to modernize and invest in its military and intelligence apparatus remains in question. With a defense budget of 1.3% of overall GDP, Germany falls visibly short of fulfilling the 2% NATO provision.[5] However, as Germany slowly enacts defense and intelligence policy reforms, Washington should support and reinforce Berlin’s position, while emboldening Germany to expand its global security footprint.
The United States can work with Germany both bilaterally and via NATO to identify niche investment areas in which Germany can specialize. The US should emphasize Germany’s existing forte of organization and efficiency when considering areas for investment. Rather than focusing on the size of Germany’s military, Washington should initially recommend support capabilities (e.g. intelligence systems, air-to- air refueling, strategic lift, etc.) in which Germany can hone expertise and focus future funding. “Owning” specific mission sets will afford Germany the opportunity to develop a further leadership role within the military alliance construct. Additionally, the US should work to encourage the German Ministry of Defense to assume a larger decision-making role in policy circles. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has long cast a shadow over defense policy, leaving the Ministry of Defense to focus on procurement and training.
Additionally, today’s dynamic threats require the US and Germany to enhance intelligence cooperation, solidifying silent linkages that facilitate a worldwide anti-terror watch and fight. In an era of radical Islamic terrorism, the cross-border exchange of intelligence is an indispensible tool in the preservation of security and stability. Germany’s complicated privacy laws make cooperation among its intelligence entities and key government ministries exceptionally difficult. To this end, the US should develop a new framework for increased bilateral intelligence sharing and collaboration with Germany. Washington should also invite Germany into the “Five-Eyes” intelligence-sharing framework, along with the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Such a sweeping initiative would add significant capability to existing members’ portfolios as well as assist the German government in managing domestic public opinion, which remains highly suspect of intelligence-related matters.
Today, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s question, “so who do I call to reach Europe?” finally has an answer. Only the German Chancellor, not the President of the European Commission, wields the political and economic clout to claim this mantle. The US must now assist Germany in developing and enhancing the security clout that befits its new role—that of America’s new “special relationship” partner of the future.
[1] German Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, Berlin, July 2016.
[2] The Economist, “Britain’s Role in the World, Muscle Memory,” 14 February 2015.
[3] Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Poland and the Future of the European Union,” Speech of Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski to the German government, Berlin, 28 November 2011.
[4] Quoted in Alison Smale and Melisa Eddy, “German Terrorism Case Highlights Europe’s Security Challenges,” The New York Times, 24 October 2016.
[5] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Military Spending in the Wake of the Ukraine Crisis,” 13 April 2015.
Jacob,
I appreciated your perspective on the German-American relationship. While I agree that Germany’s outsize influence on global affairs is not reflected in its military and intelligence prowess, I find it difficult to convince my peers here in Germany that these two areas are a worthwhile investment. The German generational memory is long, and suspicions of both government and defense run deep. It would indeed be a colossal, perhaps impossible task to convince the Berlin to allocate 2% to the Ministry of Defense.
I agree with your suggestion of developing niche capabilities for the Bundeswehr in the short-term. Your suggestions logically follow developing Germany’s military capabilities where possible during a political climate where this would not be popular. However, is this a means to and end? Or would the Bundeswehr simply be Europe’s taxi service in the event of war? I think that at some point (I do not claim to know when), Germany must take upon itself an amount of military responsibility proportionate to its political and economic capabilities.
How to make a convincing argument to Berlin remains to be seen. Your piece was well thought and well presented. This is an area that I greatly look forward to discussing more of.
Caleb makes an interesting point about the US-German relationship you write about, Jake. I agree with your point, Jake–Germany is the major Continental player the US should work with regarding Continental issues (I think France is the player regarding Africa and MENA, if only for their willingness to engage). And I think the big question here really is willingness. It seems to me that the special relationship, the Five Eyes, and the long term commitments the US makes are partly a matter of big policy, and partly a matter of thousands of individual relationships, institutions, exchanges, and other efforts to cement the relations at every echelon. And that means that people in both countries really have to want that relationship, transcending generations of bureaucrats and officers. Do you see a path for instilling this deep relationship in both countries? Or do you disagree with this premise, and see Germany as already sufficiently willing?
Hi, Isaac,
Thanks for highlighting the importance of “micro politics” in relation to the future US-German alliance. You are absolutely right that a “culture of cooperation” is necessary to advance this ambitious agenda. Some elements of cultural exchange already takes place in the form of school exchange programs, think tank fellowships, professional internships, mil-to-mil exchanges in the armed forces, etc…however, I think these programs can only advance progress to a limited point. If both countries had perhaps more integrated dialogues at the highest levels (including the cultural affinity associated with a “special relationship”) the “mutual soft-power” effect could permeate bureaucracies and private citizens alike. On a positive note, I think a well-established foundation already exists, so its a matter of making a conscious decision to deepen further this relationship at all levels.
Best, Jake
Caleb,
Thanks for your comments. I think you’ve hit the nail on the proverbial head–in order for any of these initiatives to advance, Germany must signal a willingness to prioritize defense/intelligence. This is why I believe that elevating the US-German relationship will naturally encourage successive German governments to incorporate such a strategy. Today’s crises are already showcasing many of the shortfalls in the German security apparatus (e.g. no strategic airlift capability, dependence on US for actionable intelligence). If, in the event of a future major national security challenge, the defense establishment cannot address adequately the threat public pressure may advance the process on its own. I don’t see the future Bundeswehr as a “taxi service” for Europe (as you stated), but rather as an full-spectrum force capable of operating across all domains and leading the European security community. We are no doubt very far off from this, but I do believe the US can play a constructive role in shaping the trajectory of future German decision making.
Best, Jake
Jacob,
Thanks for the input. German capability enhancement should be a high priority for the United States. As an American in Germany, this topic often comes up in conversation. Try as I may, it is hard to shake the American imperialism trope. Often suggestions or ideas on the responsibilities of Germany militarily and in intelligence to my peers are often seen through this lens, which gets in the way of constructive dialogue. Good to have this discussion!
Interesting article and I agree with your basis that a “special relationship” between the US and Germany would be a relationship that could increase stability in the international community.
I would like to hear more from you on two points in the essay on the basis and the status of the relationship.
Regarding the pillar of the relationship you stated that: “Germany’s complicated privacy laws make cooperation among its intelligence entities and key government ministries exceptionally difficult”. I am certain that these laws do limit the abilities but I believe that Germany sees these privacy laws as an important corner stone of its society that can be traced back to the experience during the Third Reich. I doubt that intelligence cooperation on the basis of weakening these laws is built on a strong foundation. Where do you think the possibilities for cooperation without weakening these laws could be?
My second point is related to the relationship itself. You stated that “Washington should initially recommend support capabilities” and “the US should develop a new framework for increased bilateral intelligence sharing and collaboration with Germany”. These statements indicate that this may be a relationship in which the US will lead and Germany will follow. For the relationship to truly be a unique relationship it needs to be seen as that of equal partners where Germany is not there to merely support the US but where both cooperate and develop strategies together. Do you think Germany will have to understand that its role will be that of a junior partner or do you think that this relationship could be one of equal partners?
Hi, Constantin,
Thanks for your comments–you bring up several interesting points. Regarding German privacy laws, I think the unfortunate German Wings catastrophe in 2015 became a public face for the need to balance personal privacy with public security. The fact that nearly all European intelligence services are heavily dependent on the US for actionable intelligence data may prompt a policy shift. Thankfully, Germany has been largely spared the radical Islamist-inspired violence leveled upon France and others; however, these types of threats require a robust tracking capability and flexibility across the spectrum of government agencies. Public opinion may shift if events take a more violent turn–in order to prevent this, there must be a willingness to take a hard look at the existing legislation and adjust for current realities. I do respect the sensitivity of this issue based on German history, but at some point, the current generations must move past events for which they bear no responsibility. A good first step would be to establish a robust, bi-lateral intelligence sharing agreement (more comprehensive than existing measures) between the US-Germany and develop the institutions, people, and organizational culture associated with it. Regarding your second point, I agree that any successful relationship must be predicated on the basis of equality among the participants. I think there is already a healthy culture of respect between the two countries that can be nurtured and developed in the future. On the other hand, certain realities will dictate that the relationship may not be “balanced” in every way. For example, if we consider the US-UK special relationship from the end of WWII through today, it is very clear that the US was the dominant partner in this construct. This was not simply a matter of political hierarchy, but rooted in the geopolitical position of each respective country. Today, however, Germany (at least to my mind) is the undisputed leader within Europe. The US must treat it as such–this means that the relationship must also reflect the mutual importance of each partner towards external audiences. I am interested to hear if you think many Germans would view their country as having a “special relationship” with the US and how they might view any such overtures from the new administration? Look forward to hearing your thoughts!
Best, Jake
Good morning from Germany, Jake!
I am not Constantin but also a fellow german so I hope my answer will be of interest to you as well.
Asking about how being offered a “special relationship” (in the way you mean that term) would be received … Well, the most likely reaction will be bewilderment and irritation, the same notions that dominated public perception of hyperbolic articles about Merkel becoming “the leader of the free world” after Trump’s election. I think there is neither a receptive mood in the society writ large nor is there a broad and articulated desire for one in the political body.
I think you wish for Germany to take on a role that it can’t play, our history, our mentality and our view of our own state and society stand against that. The public writ large remains wedded to a preference for reticence in foreign policy but especially security and defense issues (the much maligned “culture of restraint”) because it is the only modus operandi that meshes with the broadly accepted notion that military force should not be a tool to conduct foreign policy. Despite, or maybe because of, the deployments to Kosovo, Afghanistan and various other spots the “out of area” notions that NATO introduced post 1990 were never bought by the mainstream here and remain a constant source of strife even within the political body.
This domestic preference for restraint (or abstinence, as may be the more correct term) forms a growing problem for the political body in Berlin, because it is diametrically opposed to what foreign partners expect from us. This delta is growing and has been growing for years and I think at some point things will come to a head – either Washington (or Paris) will lose patience with us weird Teutons or our people will revolt over operations they don’t agree with. But if THAT issue blows it will blow up in all our faces.
Hi, Christian,
Glad you joined the conversation and thank you for sharing your perspectives! I’d like to highlight one line from your comments that speaks to the core of the special relationship challenge. You wrote, “I think you wish for Germany to take on a role it can’t play.” I would counter that Germany’s global standing has already thrust it into this elevated role and Berlin’s political significance will only increase in the future. Policy elites that choose to ignore this reality do so at great risk. Thus, the more defense and security cooperation initiated by Washington and Berlin today will ultimately pay dividends for years to come. It is my opinion that the US can play a constructive role in elevating Berlin’s security clout. The “culture of restraint” you refer to flies in the face of the responsibilities associated with a continental great power. President Gauck’s 2014 pronouncement demonstrated a recognition of this challenge: “When the last resort—sending in the Bundeswehr—comes to be discussed, Germany should not say ‘no’ on principle, nor should it say ‘yes’ unthinkingly.”
I feel it’s also appropriate to bring up a related issue that you wisely alluded to: the question of restraint, driven by a long-standing culture of guilt. It is here that politicians must be honest with their constituents regarding foreign policy. While many in Germany (and the US) may disagree, today’s democratic Germany should have nothing to feel guilty about. I think we need to strike a balance between respecting history and exercising excessive political correctness. There is no one in Germany today responsible for events that occurred over seventy years ago. Rather, Germany represents an amazing story of post-war struggle, reunification, and achievement in becoming a key world power. Its pivotal position in Europe today simply does not allow Berlin to abstain from a greater security role. If we see (and I hope this is not the case) an increase in terror attacks within Germany, popular opinion may demand these policy shifts on its own. Nonetheless, these conversations are very important to establishing a greater consensus on both sides of the Atlantic regarding the future US-German relationship.
From your perspective, are there any policies the US might implement that might shift public opinion on the “special relationship” in Germany?
Best, Jake
[Anyone else having issues with posting? Most of the times clicking Submit makes my browser want to download a PHP site.]
Hi Jake!
Given the character limit I have to answer in parts.
You said: ” Policy elites that choose to ignore this reality do so at great risk. ”
In a democracy ignoring discontent within the electorate also carries a great risk for a political body – namely that of losing elections (as the “establishment” in the person of Hillary Clinton experienced in the recent US election). Given the metrics of german political bargaining I would not bet on them going against ingrained societal instincts above a certain “pain threshold”, the disagreements over ROEs in Afghanistan are an indicator of what german politicians are most likely to do if they were obliged to send german forces into some operation the public is not supporting.
“The “culture of restraint” you refer to flies in the face of the responsibilities associated with a continental great power.”
Those “responsibilities” have no fundament in german society, they are neither perceived nor understood nor accepted. The notion of “Bigger Switzerland” has so much “pull” precisely because Switzerland has existed in some form of “neutral abstinence” for a long long time and has done pretty well out of it. To change that disregard for these “responsibilities” would require a direct and considerable effort of the political body, but they don’t engage the public because they know they have to pay a political price, a price they are not willing to pay.
Part 2:
“President Gauck’s 2014 pronouncement demonstrated a recognition of this challenge: “When the last resort—sending in the Bundeswehr—comes to be discussed, Germany should not say ‘no’ on principle, nor should it say ‘yes’ unthinkingly.””
President Gauck’s speech at Munich was scoffed at and generally ignored by the german public. The same day, literally an hour before he even held that speech, a poll came out with nearly two thirds of those polled wishing for less activism of the military kind outside our borders, a picture that other polls in 2014, 2015 and 2016 have affirmed or even strengthened.
My opinion is this: This kind of “projection” needs a certain psychological fundament for it to work. It exists in the US, in France and it existed for a long long time in the UK (although people there have become a lot more skeptical of late). It never existed in Germany, we don’t see ourselves as defenders of any “grand idea” (or concept). As the NY Times recently wrote germans have drawn from WW2 the lesson that they don’t wish to be “exceptional” in any way and I think this is the fundamental issue here – we lack the psychological element that could fuel any “projection” in the first place. Quite the contrary – we have a “small country mentality” that led an american journalist to quip that germans wish to be Liechtenstein: small, prosperous, well run and internationally utterly insignificant. And that is pretty apt a description I think.
Part 3:
“I feel it’s also appropriate to bring up a related issue that you wisely alluded to: the question of restraint, driven by a long-standing culture of guilt.”
It’s customary for foreign commentators to overstate the issue of “guilt”. That, in my opinion, hides the truth behind the meme. And that truth is that germans by and large are not willing to make sacrifices for military affairs in general (especially when we don’t perceive a direct threat of the military sort) nor do we see our society and our state as institutions that can actually provide military protection for ourselves or even others. We never could post-1945, it were always american nukes that provided true deterrence against a potential soviet attack and given the amount of nuclear weapons stationed in Germany and their planned use (which was one of the worst kept secrets of NATO) people quickly deduced that conventional military forces were but window dressing and a puppet show. One conclusion drawn from this “helplessness” was what formed “Ostpolitik” in its initial form – the attempt to defuse tensions so that it would not come to the exchange of nuclear firepower between the superpowers. Another is the utter disregard germans by and large have for the Bundeswehr and its role – given the historical experience of not being able to defend ourselves even for one single day since the founding of the Federal Republic that should not be surprising. And a third could be found in the massive protests over the NATO Dual Track Decision in the early 1980s when a large slice of the society purposely rejected the military logic of the Cold War and the continued rejection of military means for conducting foreign policy (out of principle) these days. “Guilt” for the crimes conducted by previous german states in two World Wars is only part of the issue, I think the majority of the reasons why germans don’t want to be a military power is that most of us have grown up in a state and a society which didn’t want to be a military power and because we saw/see the downsides of military engagements of other nations and have no inclination of becoming part of those issues, either.
Part 4:
“If we see (and I hope this is not the case) an increase in terror attacks within Germany, popular opinion may demand these policy shifts on its own.”
I think you’re projecting US public attitudes onto Germany, which in this case would not be correct. Germany has had issues with domestic terrorism since the early 1970s and given our constitutional setup it is viewed as petty crime and the responsibility of police and domestic intelligence, not the military. I don’t see the kind of “retaliatory instincts” that erupted in the US post 9/11 and the string of incidents this year hasn’t led to an outcry and public demand to “bomb ISIS”, either. Instead people turned towards state authorities and demanded that they “fix it” here in Germany, not in some distant lands people would be challenged to find on a globe without using google.
“From your perspective, are there any policies the US might implement that might shift public opinion on the “special relationship” in Germany?”
No and I would even urge Washington to tread very carefully where such notions are concerned. Public perception of the US has taken the twin strikes of the Iraq War and the NSA affair. If the US political body wishes to do something productive in this regard I’d vote for presenting the german political body with tough decisions. Why? Because only peer pressure will force the german political body to move beyond its narrow comfort zone, leave their ivory towers and engage the german public in a fundamental debate about our state and our view of it, a debate that has been overdue ever since 1990. This isn’t much in the political sense, but the unsolved core problems stem from intra-german issues that would need to be solved through a general societal debate. Otherwise we’ll continue to see this “muddling though” modus operandi until the point when something blows.
Jake,
I always appreciate innovative thoughts on the transatlantic defense structure, so thanks for addressing it.
However, I wonder if your argument is entirely fair to Britain. You talk about “Britain’s severely reduced military budget, pending exit from the European Union, and meager roles in both anti-ISIL efforts and the Ukraine crisis.” As I understand it, these are arguments for why Britain is no longer a good candidate for a “special relationship.” They certainly imply that Germany has more to offer than Britain on these fronts.
I would note that the UK committed 2.0% of its GDP to defense in 2015, compared to 1.2% for Germany. According to a recent 2016 report from the CRS, Britain committed 400 personnel to the fight against the Islamic State, compared to 150 from Germany (https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44135.pdf). The UK also carried out over 1,000 airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, according to the British government (https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/daesh/about), whereas Germany has not contributed to airstrikes. Furthermore, if your goal is to strengthen the transatlantic security arrangement, would it not be better to keep Britain as close to the strongest NATO military, i.e, the United States, as possible?
Recent history seems to demonstrate that Britain is more involved militarily than Germany in the defense of the current international order, and we’ve said nothing of the strong cultural and historical ties between the U.S. and the UK – for these reasons, I’m yet unconvinced that it would be better to cast aside the U.S.’s current status with the UK in favor of a “special relationship” with Germany. So I would be interested to hear more of your thoughts concerning why Germany is a superior candidate for a “special relationship.”
Hi, Ted,
Thanks for your insightful comments. I am suggesting it’s time to embrace a new paradigm shift that is already underway. There is no question that, as you say, the UK is more willing to employ military power abroad in defense of its own interests as well as the international order. Germany, on the other hand, possesses more latent power–that is, the potential to develop its armed forces on a larger scale, an economically superior position, and the now undisputed role as leader of the EU. Berlin’s central role will only increase in the future.
While UK forces have conducted more airstrikes against ISIL, let’s look at the broader security picture. Nearly 900 Bundeswehr personnel serve in Afghanistan at present, the largest non-US contingent. On Ukraine, Angela Merkel has proven to be the critical interlocutor between the West and Russia, not her counterparts in the UK or France. Germany outfitted the first non-US aircraft capable of transporting Ebola patients and pledged more than 100 million Euros to combat the epidemic. A German admiral will soon lead NATO’s naval presence in the Aegean to monitor the status of refugee flows. Additionally, Germany has delivered lethal security assistance to the Kurds in Iraq, deploying 100 soldiers to establish a training center for Iraqi forces in Irbil. I don’t think many in the policy community completely grasp just how dramatic a shift these initiatives represent for German foreign policy. And let’s remember that this is the just the beginning for Germany; think about what Berlin could do with 2 or 3 percent of its GDP dedicated to defense/intelligence.
So it’s the opposite problem of the UK. The UK now significantly lacks power projection capabilities; it’s new position of “outside looking in” to the EU only weakens its international standing. Germany has lacked the will to engage abroad, but now possesses the latent power to surpass any European competitor, if desired. The extent to which Berlin can enact a transformational defense strategy depends partly on Washington’s willingness to embolden Germany. I am not, however, suggesting that the US somehow abandon its relationship with the UK. But relationships are subject to shifting dynamics in the international system.
Thanks again for raising some very important points. Look forward to hearing your perspectives and thoughts in the future!
Best, Jake
Jake,
Commenters above have already pointed out the difficulty of getting Germany itself to sign up to a “special relationship”. I wanted to point out a different problem: the knock-on effects for the rest of NATO Europe. There is a body of opinion, particularly on the left, that German hegemony in Europe is already an established economic fact (actually, many economists have harsh words for Germany’s surplus as well), and that a military hegemony would only compound concerns about a unipolar continent. It would be, I think, a grave error to encourage anti-EU sentiment on the left in Greece and Spain when friends of the transatlantic relationship have so many enemies already.
Further, what will the French say? They are the obvious military partner historically, and will now be given a back seat. The next president, at this stage likely Fillon, already has a pro-Russian bent, which could be exacerbated by a perceived diplomatic slight.
I do think, however, that slowly encouraging Germany to take a greater role is an imperative. I only advise doing it more quietly.
Hi, Xiaodon,
Thank you for your comments on the article, I appreciate your perspectives. I think we must be careful when talking about which countries will take a “back seat” in any future security hierarchy. In my view, the emphasis is not so much on a relative power position gain/loss, but rather on a collective approach that accounts for new realities in the transatlantic security dialogue. As I have written before, whether the US and Germany choose to see it or not, Berlin’s influence in transatlantic affairs will only increase in the future. Encouraging Germany to increase its security/intelligence role is one way in which Washington can create a more even-keeled arrangement within Europe. Obviously, this cannot be a bombastic undertaking with a lot of fanfare, but a carefully nuanced approach that looks to build a macro-level shift in US-German relations. There is no question that traditional rivalries will always present roadblocks, but I believe it is up to politicians and policy makers to deliver the strategic vision to address appropriately future scenarios.
Again, thanks for your insights and look forward to continuing our discussions further.
Best, Jake
Jake, great white paper! However, we must not forget the political elite along with the wealthy control the world. Everyone is fighting for global superiority and alliances. US must leverage Germany and build that relationship ignored to have a footprint in the European Union…