Woodrow Wilson, 19th century congressional scholar and 20th century U.S. president, envied the efficiency of the British system of cabinet government. Upon the centennial anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, on July 4, 1876, he made an astonishing diary entry: “How much happier she would be if she had England’s form of government instead of this miserable delusion of a republic.” She, America, has done quite well so far, despite her “miserable delusion” of self-government. And, notwithstanding all problems on both sides of the Atlantic, the normative foundations of “the West” such as the rule-of-law, human rights and democracy – the ideas of 1776 and 1789 – are well and alive.
However, there is a certain transatlantic “communication rift”. Europeans often express amazement over America’s unique political culture and its understanding of individual freedom. From health care to gun control to social inequality: American individualism, especially articulated by conservatives, is viewed with disconcertment across the Atlantic. On the other hand, Europe is often described as a socialist hell on earth by conservative commentators in the U.S., who accuse American liberals of wanting to make “America more like Europe.” The question is: How do we tackle these transatlantic misperceptions? In order to win public support for the transatlantic relationship, decision-makers themselves should engage in an exchange of ideas.
The connection between the U.S. and Europe on a civil society level is well established through student exchange programs, economic cooperation, the influence of pop culture and the transatlantic flow of tourists in both directions. Yet, there is still potential for improvements on a political level. Contacts between the U.S. Congress and the German Bundestag are mainly organized through parliamentary friendship groups and exchange programs for young people. These programs are of indispensible value for the transatlantic friendship. However, in order to create an even firmer connection, we need to deepen these existing bonds through new levels of cooperation: transatlantic legislative working groups. These groups of parliamentarians would do two things:
- Find policy solutions to common transatlantic problems
- Foster mutual understanding across ideological boundaries
What does that mean? First, parliamentarians are an indispensible target group for a transatlantic renewal. Their ability to foster public debate, to hold the executive branch accountable and to shape policies is a key asset in order to promote mutual understanding across the Atlantic. They can influence their constituents’ views and therefore multiply the benefits created by transatlantic cooperation. Americans get ideas from their Europeans colleagues and vice versa. Those working groups, or committees, would therefore be either created ad-hoc, aimed at current political issues (single issues such as TTIP), or be permanent institutionalized (focused on policy areas such as trade or security cooperation). For instance, committees of similar jurisdictions in Congress and the Bundestag could form a working group consisting of an equal number of parliamentarians from both chambers, including all political parties. Such a transatlantic committee would meet two or three times a year (alternating between Washington and Berlin) to find common – and democratically legitimized – solutions to transatlantic policy issues. Preferably, lawmakers would form bonds across the Atlantic and across the aisle.
Second, a cross-Atlantic connection bridging ideological boundaries seems especially important. While Europe is a natural political role model for American progressives due to its more equal distribution of wealth (just take their praise of the Nordic countries), there is a wide ideological gap between conservatives, foremost represented by the Republican Party, and European political culture. The fact that the Republican Party has moved substantially to the right since the days of Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan certainly contributed to this development. But there is a “natural” difference between Europe and America as well: The clash of ideas between equality and freedom is usually won by equality in Europe and by freedom in America, shaping political culture on both sides of the Atlantic.
Whereas European coalition building in parliamentary systems with proportional representation is an integral part of its political culture, the American two-party-system is now intensely polarized, often unable to find bipartisan compromise. What has that to do with legislative working groups? For conservatives, an intellectual transatlantic discourse among center-right political parties about conservatism in the 21st century can lead to new insights on how to find policy solutions that promote economic prosperity, individual freedom, traditional values and small government without pandering to right-wing extremists and populists. Where a responsible, big-tent conservative party succeeds, right-wing extremists lose. To foster a common understanding of conservatism across the Atlantic is therefore imperative in order to find ways to resist the populist temptation. Those working groups can advance such an exchange of political philosophies.
On the other hand, liberals from both sides of the Atlantic need to acknowledge the ideological diversity within the Republican Party: moderates, libertarians, social conservatives and foreign policy hawks stand for diverse ideas. A wholesale dismissal of right-of-center voters by liberals will only increase the conservative commitment to radical ideas and prevent any meaningful debate. To paint political opponents as “the enemy” is not just democratically doubtful (democracy depends on the exchange of different ideas), but also politically short-sighted (long-lasting policy solutions are bipartisan solutions). A transatlantic dialogue fostered through new forums such as legislative working groups can boost bipartisan reforms on issues such as criminal justice reform, tax reform, infrastructure spending or foreign policy, and encourage mutual trust across the aisle. And it will lead European decision-makers to understand why their partners across the Atlantic act how they act.
To keep the ideas of 1776 and 1789 fit for the 21st century and to modernize the transatlantic narrative, deeper cross-cultural as well as cross-ideological links are indispensible. Let us start now, so that Edmund Burke’s verdict from 1790 that in certain times “[…] Moderation will be stigmatized as the virtue of cowards; and compromise as the prudence of traitors” does not become reality on both sides of the Atlantic.
Hi Florian, I agree with you that the two-party system in the US makes an actual and open discussion often hard and tends to polarize positions (at least at the surface, it is probably less true for technical/internal negotiations). However, I am afraid that this is a systemic effect and not grounded in the fact that US policy makers wouldn’t know about intermediate solutions. How exactely would you characterize the role of EU policy makers? Knowledge transfer or moderator? And, what do you think, can US American politicians teach EU policy makers (except for a general understanding of the US)? Thanks for your reply!
PS: I didn’t know Woodrow Wilson’s diary entry which made me laugh. However, I guess, he changed his opinion in his later years 😉
Dear Marie-Louise,
thanks for raising these interesting questions. However, I’m not so sure if Woodrow Wilson changed his opinion later 🙂
The role of EU policy makers could be focused on both knowledge transfer and moderation. Given that an ideological diverse spectrum of political parties from Europe would take part in such discussions, it should be easy for liberals and conservatives alike to pick areas of mutual understanding and propose new transatlantic solutions. US lawmakers could emphasize how the federal government promotes entrepreneurship in policy fields such as digitalization, given the leading role of the US in such innovative technologies. Furthermore, the US Congress as the world’s most powerful legislative body could teach European parliamentarians how to advance the institutional capacities of their legislatures in order to rein in overly expansive executive branches.
Hi Florian, I generally agree with your assessment, but I think you slightly overlooked one key aspect: the role of the media in (dis)informing conservative voters. For example, Sweden as a whole and Brussels specifically were called out as being horrible places full of rape and crime due to recent influxes of refugees. This makes any association with parliamentarians from these areas difficult for the Republican party and media to allow. While there is plenty of diversity of opinion on the right as you point out – and which the current debate on health care illustrates – ideological unity is one of the biggest factors that explains the decline of moderate Republicans in both houses of Congress (that and gerrymandering in the House).
I do agree that groups on left outright ignoring people on the right is not only wrong but counterproductive.
Hi Andrew,
thank you for your thoughts. You are right: cable news in the U.S. certainly contributed to political polarization and the emergence of so-called “echo chambers” of ideological purity. However, I’m sure that Republican lawmakers would emphasize the association with conservative parliamentarians in Sweden, Belgium, Germany, etc.
Many conservative lawmakers in Europe are pretty moderate (e.g. like Republicans from New England), so certainly both sides would benefit from such meetings. European lawmakers could emphasize the solutions they adapted in their countries to solve specific policy problems and therefore point out that a centrist way could be more successfull than the ever-lasting march to the right of the political spectrum.
Florian – I really appreciate how your essay considers the differences in internal political complexities between the two sides being discussed. Regarding your statement that “The clash of ideas between equality and freedom is usually won by equality in Europe and by freedom in America, shaping political culture on both sides of the Atlantic” – when you say “freedom,” do you mean personal freedom for individuals or generally laissez-faire governance? For example, privacy in intelligence collection and security have been big issues lately – should the TSA be allowed to physically touch your body in private places as a security measure, should the NSA be allowed to listen to your phone calls, etc. How are questions like these approached differently in the United States versus in Europe? -Mike
Dear Michael,
thanks for your comment. By “freedom” I mean the whole political culture in the U.S. compared to Europe. Whereas European societies generally favor a strong state to ensure economic equality, the U.S. in its historical and political foundations tends to emphasize “small government” and individual liberty. That includes personal freedom as well as economic laissez-faire governance. Privacy rights are a special issue: due to new digital technology, intelligence agencies have a much broader opportunity to interfere in electronic communications. Indeed, the U.S. intelligence community is the best funded, best equipped and simply the most capable intelligence apparatus worldwide. At the same time, they have multiple layers of congressional, executive and judicial oversight mechanisms to prevent abuse. Furthermore, the U.S. Congress limited the bulk collection of communications data via the “U.S.A. Freedom Act” in 2015. And let’s not forget that many of the privacy laws adopted around the world have their origins in the U.S.
However, Europeans seem more concerned about privacy issues.
Hi Florian,
Thank you for your conscientiousness when discussion the range of ideologies in the US Republican party. Living in the US (and in Washington, DC), I often hear (a majority of) people referring to the the group of people who associate as “Republicans” with a contemptful tone. (Over 90 percent of DC residents voted Democrat in the Presidential elections.) I like how your idea attempts to bridge the gap of party labels (labeling people as the “other) and share ideas to redress policy misconceptions.
Through these groups, how would you ensure that politicians are actually sharing, absorbing, and willing to implement shared ideas? Many US politicians (over 90 percent, I believe) are incumbents, meaning that they are reelected over and over again based on their long-standing and firm political stances. Implementing new policy ideas could threaten their jobs if it’s not what the people prefer.
Kind regards,
Lindsey
Hi Florian, I agree with Lindsey. A parliamentarian exchange would be beneficial to both sides but I also think that a working group is taking it a step too far. Frankly, I don’t think they’d take part in an exchange with such a strong policy component because it would make them vulnerable to criticism by their constituents, their peers, and the media. I’d focus on the “understanding part” instead. What do you think? Best, Carolin
Hi Lindsey, Hi Carolin,
thank you both for your thoughts, I am more optimistic about the “policy part”. Lindsey is right about incumbents defending their long-standing beliefs. However, many common transatlantic policy problems are non-ideological by nature, meaning that there is no fixed “Republican” or “Democratic” solution to it. In fact, most of the issues Congress is voting on are non-ideological. Considering that, it would be quite easy for conservative lawmakers to frame any policy solution that is proposed by such working-groups as a genuine “conservative” or “American” solution. However, even if they don’t, frequent meetings of European and American lawmakers would be beneficial nonetheless.
I definitely agree with you on that, Florian. I think especially on the European side lawmakers are desperate to get a better sense of what’s going on in the States right now, but haven’t yet had the chance, the contacts or the platform to do so. We need more transatlanticists in the parliaments!