This article examines the implications and solutions to the twin problems of Russian interference and right-wing populism in the US and Europe.
In 2016, right-wing populism woke up a sleeping world. Frustration about economic, political, and cultural marginalization created an unlikely alliance of union workers, suburban moms, and heartland residents who pushed Donald J. Trump to the American presidency. His victory sprang from the same forces that delivered the victories of Brexit, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Czech President Miloš Zeman, and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. In America, the populist story was about cracking down on political correctness in schools, illegal immigration from Mexico, and jobs fleeing overseas. In Europe, the nationalist narrative concerned opposing rampant refugee immigration, Islamization, and the interventionist European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As America and Europe rewrote their identities as more politically and economically isolated from the world, transatlantic relations deteriorated and were compounded by President Trump’s harsh rhetoric about NATO and his vacillating policies in Europe and the Middle East.
In response to President Trump’s deep unpopularity, right-wing populism in the West recently begun to wane. These unconventional parties lost presidential and parliamentary races since November 2016 in the Netherlands, Bulgaria, France, Finland, Austria, and the UK—populists’ polling fell precipitously after President Trump’s January inauguration. Many of these polling declines led to losses—some were rather embarrassing. The right-wing UK Independence Party (UKIP) won no seats in the British Parliament, and the independent centrist Emmanuel Macron beat right-wing nationalist Marine Le Pen by over 32 percentage points to become France’s President. These electoral trends have coincided with NATO’s resurgent popularity: many Western countries’ approval of the alliance matches right before the Great Recession. With the notable exception of Germany, NATO countries pledge to defend their ally upon a Russian attack. Even in May, supermajorities in European countries retained faith in US military support.
The transatlantic relationship and sustainability of the European project are still threatened. Russian President Vladimir Putin desires the weakening of international European institutions so he can grow political and economic influence beyond Russian borders. The election of right-wing populist parties is in his interest because these groups are more open to an alliance with Russia and suspicious of US and European foreign policy. Since invading Georgia in 2008, Putin has used sophisticated and well-funded hybrid warfare techniques to achieve his goals, staking his ideological claim on the Wild West of the Internet through paid pro-Kremlin trolls and fake news websites like Sputnik and RT, hacking emails and election databases in multiple countries, and funneling money into right-wing populist parties in Europe. Although Russia is best known for illegally annexing Crimea and invading Ukraine in 2014, the country has also used its monopoly on oil and natural gas to pressure European countries into adhering to his policies.
Russia has achieved some long-term success in turning the newest generation from the West: YouGov found in 2017 that 75% of young Western European respondents believe the EU is an economic rather than cultural alliance and one-fifth wanted their country to leave the EU. Most troubling, a majority of young respondents in Poland, France, and Italy believe that democracy is not the optimal version of government. Putin has made progress on this front because he realizes that the key to placing empires and countries on the trajectory to failure is internally dividing people about what their society should do and stand for. There is also a moral dimension to this problem: at a time when ISIS barbarically executes people and genocides occur in Iraq, Syria, and Myanmar, it is saddening to see faith in the system that best upholds rule of law and human rights decline when countries need the West most.
While the US, Europe, and Russia remain in a logjam, this is not your parents’ Cold War. The megatrends of globalization and technologization beget economies that evolve faster than people and a new cosmopolitan class with incredible cultural, political, and economic power and loyalties that transcend geographic boundaries. As social media displays the gap between them and everyone else in the aftermath of a traumatic world recession, people turn to what they view as the most effective way of breaking the system and reclaiming their identity as valued individuals in society: right-wing populism. Russia’s role in this narrative is to magnify the voices of the populists and hasten the election of officials friendly towards their interests. So the solution is twofold: disincentive Russia’s desire to carry out its hybrid warfare and rewrite the social contract to mitigate globalization’s negative effects, which enable this brand of corrosive populism in the first place.
To win the war for the soul of Europe, the US must engage in a multipronged approach. Congress should pass HR.175/S.94, which responds to Russian hackers and their allies, sanctions Russian investments of over $20 million on oil and natural gas, creates a $100 million State Department office to counter and educate on fake news across the Western Hemisphere, supports independent local language media in Europe, and requires Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to write annual report on Russian fake news agencies in US. It should also pass S.722, which includes sanctions on Russia, and refuse to enact the proposed 2018 State Department budget, which cuts the Europe and Eurasian Affairs overseas program by $20 million.
To fight the distrust in others and the world order that produce populism, it is important to heed the calls of these concerned and suffering people. The populist politicians are wrong, but their voters are right—political corruption is present, stymieing economic growth and producing social unease. Making education and public office more accessible to women and the poor will add underrepresented voices to the tables while granting current and future generations social uplift. Paid family leave, disruptive new economic actors like Uber and Lyft, and encouraging local bipartisan civil society groups foster a system that strengthens families, encourages entrepreneurship and flexible work schedules, and removes acrimony from politics. With a cohesive and morally grounded approach to Russia and our own domestic foibles, the US and Europe can Make Atlanticism Great Again.
Hi Daniela,
I enjoyed reading your well-worded and argumentative article. However, I disagree with your main proponent of change: HR.175/S.94. I’ve seen very little evidence that imposing sanctions on a country, especially Russia, does any good. Mostly, it punishes the citizens of that country, and it’s economy which then stifles the global economy as a reciprocal effect. Provoking Russia with even more sanctions is sure to further hurt that bilateral relationship. Further, do not forget that there are many Russian-Europeans, as articulated in @mathias-weber‘s article, who will not be happy with further hostile Russian sanctions.
I also see that you mainly see the solution to transatlantic affairs being in the government’s hands. Given the lack congruence in our current administration, do you think its realistic to rely on one house reposition to solve this issue?
Kind regards,
Lindsey
Given the lack congruence in our current administration, do you think its realistic to rely on one house resolution* to solve this issue?
Hi Daniela,
thank you for your article and the many sources it contained. First I appreciate you pointing out that populism in Europe is indeed waning but that we have a staggering percentage of euro-sceptic and even democracy-sceptic youth. So I agree with your assessment that political education is key to fostering transatlantic relations. However, I have to share Lindsey’s opinion regarding HR.175/S.94, especially regarding the targeting of fake news. To me, this sounds very hyprocritical, considering how much fake news the current US administration is producing. What do you think?
Hi Lindsey and Christin,
I agree that economic sanctions reduce trade and often harm economies. However, the sanctions are intended to be targeted towards large oil and natural gas transactions in S. 94 and US persons abetting Russian intelligence, defense operations, or the Russian government’s attempt to unfairly privatize state agencies in the case of S. 722. Because we recognize that the Kremlin, not the Russian people, set policy, the sanctions are highly limited to the cases in which the Kremlin most benefits from its energy monopoly and Western investment in illegal acts. Existing sanctions against Russia have been effective insofar as they have combined with low oil prices to exacerbate Russia’s enduring recession; this is important because President Putin’s support largely stems from how well his country’s economy is doing.
Regarding the role of Congress vis-a-vis the Administration and civil society, my perspective is that the voice of Congress must be amplified. Because the administration is still working on a unified message to our NATO partners/EU/Russia, I believe it is the role of the legislative branch to take the helm of US moral and political leadership. Through the passage of the Magnitsky Act and other laws, the US Congress has been a leader on human rights and other commitments to our European allies and an example for European legislative bodies to follow. Furthermore, the issues of engagement in Europe and sanctions against Russia have broad bipartisan support: S. 722 passed the Senate 98-2, and I have witnessed similarly high levels on the House side. Finally, civil society is given much-needed funding in the two bills (S. 94 funds independent local-language media in Europe who counter fake news, something also included in the $250 million State Department Countering Russian Influence Fund proposed in S. 722). One final bit I will add that we may all agree on is that State Department funding for individual countries in Europe must be maintained and increased if possible. The White House budget proposal does the opposite, but Congress rarely accepts executive branch proposals without significant changes.
Hi Daniela, thanks for your article! You are writing “While the US, Europe, and Russia remain in a logjam, this is not your parents’ Cold War.” That is correct – but in my perspective, you might overestimate the role and influence of Russia. Russia’s economy is faible, and while expenses on defence are high, they are not close to being as stron as the US or the European countries together. The advantage they possibly have is their recklessness to use it. I would broaden the view and include Turkey (which might even have more influence than Russia in Germany), at least, into a rather multipolar picture. What do you think?
One comment on the sanctions: The sanctions on Russia are very controversially debated in Germany because there are close economic ties to Russia. (as well as political and social) Most people in Germany do not want to decide between the US and Russia. Forcing them to cut them might produce the opposite effect.
Hi Marie-Louise,
Thanks for writing. Russia’s economy and military are indeed weak when compared to Europe–but that’s only relevant if we’re discussing Europe as a series of countries doing the same economic and political policies (like the US states), which isn’t the case. Putin is driving a wedge between Eastern Europe and the rest of the continent, because he wants to increase Russia’s stance relative to the EU and US (Brexit also broke in his favor). And it’s been working–see Viktor Orban, Robert Fico, and Milos Zeman, who are against sanctions on Russia after all the hacking and oligarchic takeover of media outlets in their countries! It’s also key that Russia has been more successful in shaping public opinion (youth polls) to elect politicians who are friendlier towards the country. And of course, there are the actions in Ukraine, energy monopoly, investment in Western businesses (influencing corporate lobbying), and hacking that is happening in nearly every country in Europe. So I absolutely say Russia is the top priority for the short term.
I am not aware of what kind of influence Turkey has on Germany or the rest of Europe–this is worth looking into. Regarding Germany, many eastern European countries are going through a similarly ambivalent time regarding their attitudes towards Russia–making any EU/NATO response to Russian aggression more difficult and leaving a void for Russia and others to exploit. So my opinion is that the only way Europe can respond effectively to Russia is if Germany is on board due to its power in the region. If Germany does not want to have the same experience the US did during the 2016 election cycle (Germany is a prime target this year, and the email accounts of the Bundestag were already hacked), then a proactive action is likely needed. My final point is that if Europe doesn’t have a unified response on issues like Russia, migration, etc. then it won’t likely be a viable power in the multipolar future.
Hi Marie-Louise,
Thank you for your article and interesting remarks concerning the US, Europe and Russia and some underlying patterns and trends that can be drawn from recent developments. I do agree that highlighting the poorly hidden propaganda and fake news situation is critical for personal understanding, international relations and mitigating the unwanted effects that it may have on a population. However, because information is spreading so fast and the social medias built in mechanisms to promote attention-getting stories (like fake news often are) – this may be a very difficult challenge. The internet has become an object for countries to form a strategic advantage, and so far many have been able to do so without any severe blowback or consequences. When proposing increased sanctions – a serious analysis must be conducted of the effectiveness and any unintended side effects of it. What are your thoughts? How do you propose to motivate private companies to support this initiative?
Best,
Brandy
Hi Brandy,
I think we agree on the need for sanctions’ impacts to be closely studied before anything is passed, and I believe Congress’ calculus is that this is the most effective way to change Russia’s behavior. The fact that we targeted these policies towards individuals and entities in the Russian government rather than the entire Russian population does insulate the US from some unintended consequences. Policymakers have used classified briefings, voices of experts and people on the ground, and precedent of our current sanctions on Russia to tease out unintended consequences and modify the language of the bill to mitigate them. We are doing our best to be careful with unintended financial consequences–things like getting a nonpartisan CBO score help According to S. 722, the bill that includes expanded sanctions on Russia, the US government will increase information-sharing with private companies to make stem illicit Russian financial flow to Western businesses. And the US will prosecute any businesses that evade our sanctions. Regarding the “carrot” aspect of getting companies to help us, I think many small and medium-sized businesses without the resources to pay for lawyers and cyber systems will be willing to help given the historically high level of Russian (often citizens who may or may not be contracted by the govt) cyberattacks on them. From early 2014-16, 1/5 of these companies reported a cyberattack and lost $32,000 on average per instance. These companies know they are targets for ransomware attacks from Russia and other countries and are willing to accept help from the US government because it is financially in their best interest. The picture may be more complicated for the largest companies, even though some like Fedex have been hacked recently.
Hi Daniela,
Thank you for your response. When I discuss sanctions as an option, I mostly have concern for the communities it seems to affect the most (individuals) and it also seems to take a long time to have an effect. In light of the recent announcement of the US intention to work together with Russia on a cybersecurity initiative…how do you think this will impact your proposal for congressional support?
Best,
Brandy
Hi Brandy,
I agree that some communities are being economically impacted (often due to Russia launching countersanctions to the EU). However, I will say two things: 1) given that diplomacy and military action aren’t feasible/desirable at the moment, sanctions are the best short-term option on the table and 2) President Putin will only change his policies if he becomes unpopular given the 2018 presidential elections. Though his approval ratings are in the mid 80s, Russia has its biggest protests against the Putin regime in years recently, with 150,000+ protesting in 100+ Russian cities despite the government’s threats to their safety; a majority of Russians supported the protests, according to Levada.
Regarding the cybersecurity initiative (given the fact that this is evolving very quickly), nothing seems to be emerging (Trump and Russia just shot down its chance of happening on Twitter). The proposed program seems like it will be delayed if it happens at all (many congressmen came out against it this weekend), so I doubt it will have an impact on the bill, which may be voted on this week.
Hey Danni,
Thank you for your thorough response. It will be interesting to learn the outcome of the vote. Keep me posted on the thread!
Best,
Brandy