On both sides of the Atlantic we currently witness the specter of populism. This populistic surge appears to be an epiphenomenon of a more comprehensive exhaustion of the Western liberal project.
The presidential election in the United States has brought into the White House the leading populist figure of our times – Donald Trump. Across the Atlantic, somewhat dwarfed vis-à-vis their American counterpart, European populists such as Marine le Pen (France), Frauke Petry (Germany), Nigel Farage (UK), Jaroslaw Kaczynski (Poland) or Viktor Orbán (Hungary) shake the political landscape. The transatlantic sphere thus finds itself confronted with an overarching trend that requires analytical scrutiny, especially since the term populism has grown fashionable and is being utilized to characterize a plethora of political actors and programs. Hence, which distinctive features does populism bear and how do they tie in with the larger signs of liberal fatigue? The differences between the abovementioned actors notwithstanding, a crucial commonality can be shown.
Populism, as the political theorist Jan-Werner Müller has pointed out, is built around the central claim to exclusive moral representation of the people. The populist purports that he or she alone embodies and enacts the political will of a nation that is conceived of as a homogeneous entity. Pivotal in this conception is the anti-pluralist impetus. As the populist allegedly brings to the fore what the ‘true people’ (das Volk) really wants, dissenting political opinions are dismissed, sometimes even as acts of treason. In its invocation of ‘the people’, populism renders itself immune against factual evidence of a more fractured and diverse – and in this sense: more democratic – political configuration. Per definitionem, ‘the people’ cannot lose in the political contest. Accordingly, empiricism is trumped by reference to a putative ‘silent majority’ and its tacit knowledge of substantive political truths that the populist gives voice to. ‘The system is rigged and I alone can fix it!’
The anti-pluralist thrust of populism, its structural closedness and gesture of exclusion, provides the nexus with the current dire state of the liberal agenda in the US and the EU. Liberalism, with its core notions of freedom, tolerance, primacy of individual self-determination over social ties and wariness of unbridled state power, exhibits an elective affinity with openness. It seeks to ensure discretionary spaces for each one to develop their personal form of life. Openness, however, has severely lost currency in the West – and populism is a symptom of this development. Across the transatlantic sphere, culture and identity politics have resurfaced: the growing request for representation of minorities such as Latinos, African Americans and Muslims in the US and the migration of predominantly Muslim refugees into the EU shift demographics and test the boundaries of tolerance and pluralism. Opposition against changes towards greater ethnic and cultural diversity in society demonstrates that Western countries are entangled in arduous processes of figuring out who and what they are. This renegotiation of societal values is complemented by the socioeconomic consequences of the liberal project of globalization. On the one hand, the free movement of capital and labor has allowed massive wealth creation; on the other, it has sharpened the question of inequality. Whether the motives for the anti-liberal sentiment are cultural, socioeconomic or both, we should be aware that it is by no means articulated by the so-called ‘deplorables’ only, but by the well-off too. And while it is regressive, it cannot be dismissed as a thing of the past, for the problem is precisely that it might be the future.
Two observations of such regressive trends are in order. Firstly, regarding the political realm, the strong state has become en vogue again. It is the political right that has grasped the current crisis of the liberal paradigm and stepped up with the promise to protect citizens against the demands of modernity – most prominently by reinstalling social cohesion and security. The emphasis on security, spurred especially by an ongoing fear of terrorism, entails the recognition of control, discipline and restriction of personal liberties as core functions of the state. Secondly, regarding the economic realm, the backlash against liberalism takes the form of widespread rejection of free trade agreements such as TTIP. Interestingly, the right and the left join forces in this protectionist endeavor, with the former advancing nationalist motives to support domestic industries and the latter suspecting a further weakening of the public sector in the interest of multinational corporations. Consequentially, borders experience a renaissance – physical borders against the influx of foreign people, figurative borders against the influx of foreign goods – and the nation state is favored over supra-national structures as the adequate political framework. Freedom and openness are palpably under duress in view of this regressive attempt to slam the door on globalization.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union we were said to have entered the era of uncontested free-market capitalism and liberal democracy. According to this verdict, it was ‘the end of history’. The populism and authoritarian inclinations in the transatlantic sphere, however, suggest that we are witnessing the end of the end of history. The naïve and self-satisfied premise that liberal progressivism were an historic inevitability has been debunked. Liberals themselves need to learn a lesson in pluralism and start to think harder about the reasons for the allure of regressive political offerings. Attuned to diversity as they profess to be, they need to engage seriously with positions that severely challenge their own vocabulary and outlook in order to be able to make sense of our times.
Finally, who can best be expected to revitalize liberalism in the transatlantic partnership? As the role of the US as global guarantor of a liberal order is thrown into question under President Trump, the EU will have to assume more responsibility on the world stage. The good news is that despite its own populist challenges and post-Brexit fragility, at least in Western Europe the moderates still prevail. Concretely, we must now put our faith in Germany and France to ‘make liberalism great again’.
Hi Lutz-Peter,
You’ve written a great characterization of the populist phenomenon and its implications. I have two questions for you. First, do you think that France and Germany, even working together, have the capacity and will to uphold the liberal order to the same extent that the United States has in the past? Second, you ended with an optimistic notion that in Western Europe, the moderates still reign. Both France and Germany have national elections in 2017, and in both countries the far right stands to make significant gains. In France, the Front national and its leader Marine le Pen have a fairly good chance of winning the presidency, and even the more moderate conservative candidate, Francois Fillon, wants to move closer to Russia and is an admirer of Putin. In Germany, although Angela Merkel will probably retain her chancellorship, the Alternative für Deutschland will most likely gain seats in the Bundestag for the first time and continue its successes in state level elections. Do you think that these far right elements will make big gains in their respective elections in 2017, and if so, can France and Germany still guard the liberal order?
Hi Connor,
thank you very much for your comment!
Regarding your questions:
1) I don’t think that the US is replaceable on the world stage when it comes to defending liberal order, for France and Germany don’t have equal political and economic power. What I do believe is possible in France and Germany, however, is that they will withstand the populist offerings, uphold liberal values and thus strengthen the EU as a whole. (Further, I’m fairly optimistic that the US will eventually recover from the current backlash because it has a certain record of producing a sequence of quite antagonistic political agendas – Bush, Obama, Trump… This harkens back to my point in the essay that liberal advances cannot be extrapolated in a straightforward way, that progress isn’t inevitable. This insight can help us manage our expectations and make us all the more aware that whenever progress becomes possible, we need to seize the opportunity.)
2) As far as Germany, my impression is that the AfD can be contained. Yes, it will gain a considerable share of votes. But it is still far away from being part of the government and shaping policies at the highest executive level. I agree that France is a different case as Le Pen stands a real chance of becoming president. Fillon is a strong contender, though, and I’d still see him within the confines of a broadly defined liberal pattern (freedom, tolerance, individualism, restriction of state power), especially in terms of his economic policies. Plus, he lacks the populism, the exclusive moral claim to represent the people. So, if Germany and France don’t succumb to demagogy in the respective elections, I think this would be a positive signal that core EU countries can uphold the liberal order.
I hope these very brief remarks help to clarify my position. Happy to hear your thoughts!
Best,
Lutz
Like the reader above, I question of France and Germany have been such exemplary examples of liberalism. In addition to growing far right parties, there’s been a ban or discussed ban of wearing the burqa as religious garment in pubic.
I do agree that these far right movements have seized the moment in their respective states, going from advocates of small government to advocates of policies of a police state. It’s interesting how Trump capture the Tea Party without their focus on individual liberty and privacy concerns. These interests need to be re-injected into the political landscape to check populist tendencies in these leasers.
This was an interesting read. I would be interested in hearing your definition of liberalism. It seems to be semantically complicated. In the US, for example, liberalism as a term is not used to describe a freedom-based approach to government, but more a soft-socialism approach. Ironically, however, the classical liberal in America, usually described as conservative, finds his or her allies in European liberal parties. Economic liberalism, meaning a pro-lassiez fair capitalism, is described as fiscal conservatism in the US. I suppose my point here is small, and simply that the semantics of using these terms complicates the debate across national boarders and would benefit from greater clarity in general.
Brandon, Michael,
You two are bringing up some issues that really need to be discussed.
As I understood it from the article, Lutz-Peter focuses on two criteria: a “weak” state and free trade, both criteria rather matching the fiscal conservatism Brandon evokes.
When it comes to this economic liberalism, our question has to be if reenforcing a conservative order will really help to attack the problem: Clearly, demanding a stronger state in social security and protectionism are, themselves, causes of a capitalist and globalized order that, while benefitting our economies as whole, produced many inequalities and “losers of globalization” as well – a clever modification of the liberal state with a clear focus on redistribution would, in this case, be an answer preferable to building up the causes of the problem.
On the other hand, one could also interpret Lutz-Peter’s article using the term “liberalism” as a much broader approach, opposed to “populism”… What are your thoughts on this?
Lutz-Peter, maybe you can help us in dissipating our confusion!
Greetings
Jonathan
Hi Brandon, hi Jonathan,
thanks for bringing up these important semantic questions. I’m aware that liberalism is a contentious concept and – as Brandon has laid out nicely – takes on different meanings in the US and Europe when used to describe policies or parties. As Jonathan correctly assumes, I’m refering to liberalism in a broader sense, namely as a philosophical/political tradition. Despite liberalism’s complicated genealogy, I believe one can still characterize the notions of freedom, tolerance, individual self-determination and opposition against unchecked state power as constitutive features. (Opposition against a ‘strong’, i.e. authoritarian or totalitarian, state does not entail favoring a ‘weak’ one. It is mandatory that the state be effective in delivering public goods – while adhering to a balance of powers and respect for private spheres.) My point is that liberalism understood in this broad sense allows us to capture the essential features of the Western political and economic model. This is the model that, in the light of widespread populism, seems somewhat exhausted and is in need of a revitalization.
I hope that answers some of your questions!
Lutz-Peter, interesting analysis of the current rise in populist thinking on both sides of the Atlantic. You mention some of the European populist leaders, and of course The Netherlands’ Geert Wilders or Austria’s Norbert Hofer could be included on that list. I found your point that “opposition against changes towards greater ethnic and cultural diversity in society demonstrates that Western countries are entangled in arduous processes of figuring out who and what they are” eloquently put. The concept of national/ regional identity is multifaceted and intriguing, and I’m curious: Do you think it’s more important for a country to be united under the same perceived national identity, or do you think it is healthier for a country to have various regional/ sub-cultural identities much more strongly represented than an overarching national identity? I believe that true diversity entails embracing, not eradicating, diversity, but that’s not to say that a positive national consciousness and unity is negative. It’s figuring out the proper balance (and proper system to promote that balance) that’s the question. I’d love to hear you elaborate your thoughts in these ideas. Then given your attitude toward the ideal levels of national identity in a country, what policies do you envision implementing over the next three years to move toward your ideal?
Hey Eliza,
Your comment touches a really important point: the level of “nationalism” or “patriotism” a society should have or needs to be, in a way, sustainable. Let me elaborate on the thought of sustainability: The current, established orders, both in the US as in Europe, have supported identity-building above the national state. Taking Europe’s example, the European integration has always been engendered by tentatives to create a European identity; most laws (for the national states) are nowadays decided upon in Brussels or Strasbourg; and the sharing of debt (Eurobonds), responsibility in international organisations, and surely within the next years, of refugees, is constantly progressing.
The European integration is, thus, progressing faster than the creation of a European identity, one factor in explaining the anti-European resentments plopping up all over the continent. This nationalist backlash is deplorable, but also in a way understand- or at least explainable. Identities change at a much slower pace than policies.
Of course, reversing integration and cooperation cannot be a solution. However, in future endeavors, identity should have a much more important place!
Thank you very much for your comment, Eliza. The question you pose is a really tough one to address. Historically, it seems to me that racial or cultural homogeneity is not necessarily more conducive to peace and stability than heterogeneity. Therefore, multiculturalism is by no means doomed to fail. Generally, I’d say, the condition of success is some sort of codified and/or non-codified consensus on the political system/constitution/principles of governance, the role of the individual in society, the role of faith/religion (and its relation to politics), certain customs/mores, etc. I doubt, however, that there’s any such thing as an ideal level of national identity. In my view, it’s not a question to be settled theoretically or pre-politically; rather, it is continuously negotiated in the political process itself. And the answers vary from country to country, also within a particular country over time.