It’s time to separate the rhetoric from reality. The awkward public exchanges between Angela Merkel and Donald Trump—despite the hyperbolic reactions on both sides of the Atlantic—should not change the strategic partnership between the US and Germany. On the contrary, a window of unique opportunity exists to redefine the US-German partnership as the “special relationship” of the future. Let’s hope politicians in both countries possess the strategic vision to seize the moment. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the realm of security cooperation. Developments in Ukraine, Russia’s resurgence, and the fight against ISIS underscore the critical need for a strong, unified European security framework; however, the one country that must lead, Germany, still struggles to find its voice in security affairs. Germany has too long been haunted by its past and cannot allow the shadows of the Second World War to cloud its future calculus. Particularly in the aftermath of Brexit, Berlin’s global influence as de facto European Union leader presupposes greater military and intelligence roles on a global scale. The German Ministry of Defense’s July 2016 “White Paper,” which outlines more ambitious overtures in defense policy, is a step in the right direction(1). Washington must build upon this foundation and elevate its alliance with Berlin to that of an enduring “special relationship,” one in which Germany emerges as America’s most significant political, economic, and security partner in Europe.
Assigning the term “special relationship” to German-US ties does not occur automatically to most in the American and European policy communities. However, both countries must now account for new geopolitical realities vice status quo arrangements. Most notably, Washington’s storied “special relationship” with the United Kingdom does not merit as significant a role as in the past. Britain’s severely reduced military budget, pending exit from the European Union, and meager roles in both anti-ISIL efforts and the Ukraine crisis, illustrate London’s diminished global influence (2). France, although willing to employ aggressively its military forces abroad, does not possess the economic or political influence to steer singlehandedly European Union policy. Washington’s special relationship with Berlin will not only benefit bilateral relations; a Germany more engaged in global security operations is critical to the maintenance of the current international order. Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski perhaps expressed this sentiment best in 2011, stating, “I fear German power less today than German inaction (3).”
Domestic unrest in Germany as a result of the refugee crisis underscores the German security establishment’s inability to address terrorist threats. Guido Steinberg, a terrorism expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, stated recently, “In a way, we have outsourced our counterterrorism to the US. Germans are not ready to build up their intelligence capabilities for political reasons, so this will continue (4).” Indeed, Germany’s commitment to modernize and invest in its military and intelligence apparatus remains in question. With a defense budget of 1.3% of overall GDP, Germany falls visibly short of fulfilling the 2% NATO provision (5). However, as Germany slowly enacts defense and intelligence policy reforms, Washington should support and reinforce Berlin’s position, while emboldening Germany to expand its global security footprint.
The United States can work with Germany both bilaterally and via NATO to identify niche investment areas in which Germany can specialize. The US should emphasize Germany’s existing forte of organization and efficiency when considering areas for investment. Rather than focusing on the size of Germany’s military, Washington should initially recommend support capabilities (e.g. intelligence systems, air-to- air refueling, strategic lift, etc.) in which Germany can hone expertise and focus future funding. “Owning” specific mission sets will afford Germany the opportunity to develop a further leadership role within the military alliance construct. Additionally, the US should work to encourage the German Ministry of Defense to assume a larger decision-making role in policy circles. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has long cast a shadow over defense policy, leaving the Ministry of Defense to focus on procurement and training.
Additionally, today’s dynamic threats require the US and Germany to enhance intelligence cooperation, solidifying silent linkages that facilitate a worldwide anti-terror watch and fight. In an era of radical Islamic terrorism, the cross-border exchange of intelligence is an indispensible tool in the preservation of security and stability. Germany’s complicated privacy laws make cooperation among its intelligence entities and key government ministries exceptionally difficult. To this end, the US should develop a new framework for increased bilateral intelligence sharing and collaboration with Germany. Washington should also invite Germany into the “Five-Eyes” intelligence-sharing framework, along with the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Such a sweeping initiative would add significant capability to existing members’ portfolios as well as assist the German government in managing domestic public opinion, which remains highly suspect of intelligence-related matters.
Today, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s question, “so who do I call to reach Europe?” finally has an answer. Only the German Chancellor, not the President of the European Commission, wields the political and economic clout to claim this mantle. The US must now assist Germany in developing and enhancing the security clout that befits its new role—that of America’s new “special relationship” partner of the future.
(1) German Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, Berlin, July 2016.
(2) The Economist, “Britain’s Role in the World, Muscle Memory,” 14 February 2015.
(3) Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Poland and the Future of the European Union,” Speech of Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski to the German government, Berlin, 28 November 2011.
(4) Quoted in Alison Smale and Melisa Eddy, “German Terrorism Case Highlights Europe’s Security Challenges,” The New York Times, 24 October 2016.
(5) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Military Spending in the Wake of the Ukraine Crisis,” 13 April 2015.
Hi Jake,
what a great and precise summary of the current transatlantic stands of security. While I agree that Germany – certainly in most areas of European integration – has taken on a leader role, I was wondering why you chose to circle out Germany as a security allie to the US instead of the European Union or e.g. its High Representative? Could you see this single US-Germany relations destabilizing the integrity of the EU?
Germany is the de facto leader of European Union, that’s why they’re the best choice for increased militarization. For various reasons, it’s also the epicenter of Islamic terrorism, so it also has a responsibility to itself to lead the way for increased security.
Besides, the EU has no army, and Jean Claude Jucker and co don’t strike me as open to re-militarization.
Hi, Anna. Yes, agree with you that Germany’s position as de facto EU lead necessitates it assuming a larger defense and intelligence role. I think it’s hard to geographically designate a “center” of Islamic terrorism in Europe. One could argue that France, Belgium, and the UK have actually suffered a larger string of attacks than Germany has to date. I am interested to hear more about your rationale on that assertion. Thanks!
I meant a center historically. The reason that so many Islamic terrorists even made it into Europe in the first place was a perceived invitation for migrants to come to Germany. The most fatal attacks happened elsewhere, who knows why. I’d still argue for Germany to re-militarize because (1) they’re the most capable country in Europe to do so, and (2) has a moral responsibility to fix the refugee problem that it’s caused.
Actually the majority of islamist attackers were second or even third generation immigrants from former french colonies in Northern Africa, people who were born and raised in Europe and got radicalized here. As such I have to vividly reject your notion of Germany being responsible for the majority of the attacks, the inability of French (and Belgian) societies to integrate these descendents of immigrants played as much if not far more a role in their radicalization. Not to mention that Germany is simply unwilling and unable to “militarize” because that runs counter to our self-perception and view of our state as a society.
Hi Anna,
I would love if you could support your point about Germany being the historic center of Islamic terrorism with some more examples or sources. As I read your comment, it sounds as if you regard the invited migrants of the 1970s as a source of Islamic terrorism, a statement I deem rather harmful. Also I do not understand the connection between the refugee ‘crisis’ and Germany’s need to re-militarize, so it would be great if you could explain that in more detail.
Hi, Christin. Thanks for your insightful questions. I think there is some dissonance within German security and political circles between visions of what Germany ought to be and the country’s current geopolitical reality. Simply said, Germany is just too important a player to not develop and rely on its military element of national power. At present, no credible defense structure exists within the EU, which is why my article suggests a US/German defense partnership approach. But the “special relationship” I reference certainly implies a deeper connection than solely defense matters. More broadly, I think the US and Germany need to develop even closer bonds that emphasize enhanced socio-cultural ties as well as the full spectrum of national power. Defense is a good area to begin because it presents a tangible opportunity for the two countries to build on a partnership that is mutually beneficial. If we consider Germany’s contributions to training the Kurds in northern Iraq, troop contributions to Afghanistan, efforts to combat Ebola, and counter-piracy missions, one notes a marked increase in participation as compared with just ten years ago. A major problem lies in the German public’s perception of how and where the Bundeswehr should be employed. The view that military power is taboo has persisted for so long that strategic thinking has become limited. Germany certainly has the right to expand and develop its military forces without concerns for events that occurred over seventy years ago.
Hi Jake, thanks very much for sharing your well-written article. While I can see the logic in your argument, I wonder if the US and Germany have enough shared security concerns to sustain a special relationship. In terms of fighting terrorism, and especially in deterring domestic attacks, there definitely do exist shared interests. On more interventionist military activity, I imagine there would be greater disagreement as Germany is reluctant to deploy forces overseas (for example, Germany opted out of the NATO intervention in Libya). What are your thoughts? Do you think that such differences could strain a security relationship?
Hi, Angela. Thanks for your kind remarks and prescient questions. Let me first say that I agree with your view regarding foreign military interventions. I think at this point both the US and NATO wished the disastrous Libya intervention never occurred! To your broader points, however, I do think there are ample interests to sustain a bona fide special relationship. Perhaps the most important aspect of developing the concept is the approach taken by Washington. A special relationship must be based on mutual respect. I’m not suggesting this will necessarily be a partnership of “equals” (just as the US/UK was not), but one that maximizes the collective strengths of both countries. Some may infer that I am bypassing or ignoring the EU here. That is not the case. Rather, I am suggesting that we account for new power realities. No major policy initiative in Europe will succeed absent Germany’s support. In terms of defense, think about what Germany could accomplish with an order of magnitude increase in defense spending. Furthermore, European (and particularly German) intelligence agencies are recognizing that for all of the criticism leveled over the past few years, Washington is the best source of actionable intelligence against radical Islamic terrorism. Developing these capabilities by assigning niche areas in which each country can invest is a good way to move forward. Rather than building infrastructure and capacity in a vacuum, the US and Germany can forge an even closer path of cooperation.
Hello Jake,
I think you wrote an excellent article advocating for a US-German special relationship. The special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom was solidified over the years through cultural connections, a shared language, and close cooperation during two world wars. It is important not only for the establishments of both countries to feel that there is a special relationship, but for the general public of both countries to feel so as well. I like your idea of building this foundation through increased security development and cooperation. I was curious if you have any suggestions for how to convince the German public that increasing the engagement and activity of their military and intelligence services is necessary and desirable?
Hi, James. Thanks for your comments! I couldn’t agree with you more regarding the need for public “buy-in” of a special relationship framework. Part of the problem concerns very legitimate negative perceptions held by the German public regarding intelligence agencies in general. The experience of the Stasi is certainly well documented. Beyond that, it’s really a matter of education to change the public’s perception. The fact is that actionable intelligence is truly the most effective weapon in combating radical Islamic terrorism. European intelligence agencies are far too reliant on their US counterparts in this regard, while the public then rails against the very same entities that are instrumental to thwarting such attacks.
I agree that both Germany and NATO would benefit from increased German defensive capabilities. In the short term, though, do you think it would be possible for Germany to meet NATO’s 2% goal by subsidizing US forces in German territory? I believe that a form of subsidization already occurs (http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/07/donald-trump-doesnt-understand-the-value-of-u-s-bases-overseas/). This money could be added to the equation, and possibly increased, to allow Germany to reach the level set by NATO. This could take the form of non-combat related subsidies for items such as food and utilities. The money could be put to work immediately, without the public perception of a “militarized” German society. American taxpayers would also feel compensated for the expense they are incurring for Germany’s benefit. Over time, Germany could decrease the money paid in subsidies while increasing investment in their military and intelligence infrastructures.
James, I think it depends on which problem we’re trying to solve. Increased subsidies for US forces in Germany don’t address the real issue at hand. Rather, this would be more of an effort to placate US concerns, not provoke negative German public opinion, and essentially maintain the status quo. If we’re talking strictly about the perception game, your suggestion might work in the short term. Such an option would fail to address the fundamental problems of disproportionate distribution of capabilities within the alliance. In my opinion, if a US-German “special-relationship” emerged, there would be a renewed public consciousness of shared responsibility and commitment, both towards the NATO alliance and US-European relations. By encouraging Germany to take a leadership role, we’d set the stage for increased military capabilities and defense cooperation. That is good for Europe, the US, and the periphery. In many aspects, I believe Europe possesses more soft power than the US. This is a good thing. Such political capital allows for a reinvestment of military capabilities without appearing as “expansionist” or “reactionary.” This would also serve to create a stronger “European” security framework, guaranteed by the de facto leader of the European project. This wouldn’t happen overnight, however, and requires a long-term commitment to a true transformation. How do you think we could further frame the debate? Or are we asking the wrong questions? Best, Jake
Thanks for answering my question. I agree that it is important for Germany to expand its military capability and give its defense institutions more initiative. You bring up an interesting point that Europe has significant soft power, which can help reduce negative diplomatic consequences of an increase in hard power capability. Including German subsidies to US forces in the NATO 2% goal could be a way to temporarily satisfy the US public, with the long term goal being to increase investment in German defense and intelligence agencies. However, this might also take away incentive for German politicians to increase military spending. One other way to frame the debate could be similar to Angela Merkel’s oft quoted words that Europe should “take our fate into our own hands” (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/following-trumps-trip-merkel-says-europe-cant-rely-on-us-anymore/2017/05/28/4c6b92cc-43c1-11e7-8de1-cec59a9bf4b1_story.html?utm_term=.e300b08cf8dd). This quote is a bit of a double edged sword, and can bring up questions about the dependability of the US. The takeaway message to be emphasized is that Europe, and Germany in particular, can become more militarily self-sufficient. Increasing military spending and leadership roles within NATO can be a way for Germans to control their fate, and avoid any public perception that Germany is overly dependent on US military power.
Jake, great suggestions! I think it would be an easier sale to the German public if Germany increased its military spending intitially in support capabilities, i.e. “non-offensive” capabilities. One central reason why Germany is a difficult partner has been been unmentioned: parliamentary oversight over military missions abroad. Somewhere I heard that this was a problem for regular NATO air policing over the Mediterranean Sea during the Libya campaign because the German parliament had not cleared support for that mission. Anyhow, I am not sure if our allies would want German support capabilities be dependent on a mandate by the Bundestag in case of a crisis.
Also, Anna, how is Germany “the epicenter of Islamic terrorism”?
Ohhhh Thomas …. various reasons ….
I seem to have developed temporary amnesia though, darn 🙂
Thomas, thanks for your questions. I agree with you that support capabilities are a good place to start in terms of increasing Germany’s military spending. The US could also move the process along by assigning more specific capabilities to the German Armed Forces within the structure of NATO (this already occurs to a degree, but I’m envisioning an order of magnitude increase/shift). On the other hand, I’m not sure that parliamentary oversight of Bundeswehr missions is a show stopper. More specifically, the German Armed Forces have been increasingly participating in more external deployments over the last decade. The German government has, albeit very slowly, adapted its approach on external missions for the armed forces. The case of Libya represented more of a political reluctance at the highest levels of the German government versus the Bundestag’s “stonewalling” of any deployment. So in this sense, I’m confident that the government in Berlin will demonstrate flexibility in adjusting the parameters surrounding future employment of the armed forces. Best, Jake
Dear Jacob,
I really enjoyed to read your article. I fully endorse all of what you say in your article. The Germans and the Europeans need to get away from the misbelief of unconditional security in Europe. Close political cooperation is not a permanent gift; it’s a process of give and take at both informational and military. To consolidate “the bond of friendship” I would propose a strategic community of responsibility with the US („Partners in Leadership“). Security policy touches the centerpiece of national interest and is built on trust and consideration. This for me is also the reason why the dream of an European intelligence service or an European FBI is unbelievable. If more binding coordination of interests, abilities, knowledge or information in a mode of continuous governance could be realized, we are on the right course. Do you think in the event-driven field of security there could be more possible?
Greetings
Tim
Tim, thanks for your thoughtful remarks. In principle, I would agree with you in terms of a closer framework for European security and intelligence cooperation. In reality, however, the same debates that pit sovereign states against the Brussels bureaucracy regarding immigration, taxes, and economic matters will cloud similar discussions on security. In order for a European intelligence service or FBI, as you suggest, to materialize, we’d need to see a European Union that is fundamentally transformed into a more integrated construct. That means less sovereignty for individual states and increased devolution to Brussels. Based on recent debates (and for example, a still unratified EU constitution) now does not seem to be the time for such dramatic policy shifts. Ultimately, the interoperability and sharing capabilities across the EU must be improved, as well as trans-atlantic cooperation in the fight against extremist terror groups. Best, Jake
Jake – thank you for your service. Regarding the highly-complex challenge of encouraging Germany to develop an increased leadership role on military matters, what do you think about the United States leveraging NATO as a platform for facilitating this transition? Certainly a complex and sensitive issue on all sides right now, but I bring it up because you suggested peripheral support roles like air-to-air refueling, surveillance, etc.
Recently, NATO has been limiting its role outside of its borders to these support activities. Is there a possibility to encourage Germany to “own” some of these peripheral activities as a way of pushing the German constituency to grow accustomed to an increased security role but at a reasonable pace? This might also have a potential benefit on this side of the Atlantic in the form of providing another potential use case for NATO for the American constituency. -Mike
“Is there a possibility to encourage Germany to “own” some of these peripheral activities as a way of pushing the German constituency to grow accustomed to an increased security role but at a reasonable pace?”
I, as a german citizen and voter, would consider this utter duplicity. What Germany needs to do is to hold a no-holds-barred debate on defense issues but without any pre-determined results. If “Magna Helvetia” and neutralism are the result of societal majorities then that is the way things are … and if the people here are supposed to consider alternatives then they need to be talked to (not talked about), given real arguments (and not the pseudo-rhetorics sugarcoating everything that people have learned to spot 10 km against the wind) and a real choice. But just as the german political body is too united in political cowardice in the face of the electorate the foreign world utterlay lacks the understanding for the peculiarities, taboos and mentalities of the german society. Which results in contra-productive suggestions and rhetoric which only reinforces domestic attitudes here that decry military activism as a backslide to the “Dark Ages” of Imperialism (and even Neo-Colonialism).
Well I think this is why we are here holding these discussions – thank you for your input! -Mike
Christian, thanks for your perspectives. While I think extreme comparisons to imperialism and neocolonialism are a stretch, there is one key point on which I am in total agreement with you. This entire discussion is predicated upon a policy that must be, unquestionably, a German decision. It must be the German public and the German government that ultimately endorse, embrace, and desire to see through this fundamental transition. My suggestions merely attempt to demonstrate the role Washington can play in assisting Germany in its transition towards such an outcome. If Germany doesn’t view the US as a viable partner, or if perceptions have become so mangled that cooperation is prohibited, it’s essentially a non-starter. That’s why the special relationship has to extend to socio-political, economic, cultural, and educational venues. The defense element is important and consists of what I would call “low-hanging fruit”–something the two countries could mutually benefit from and frame to their collective voting blocs. Political will is a precious commodity and we’ll have to see where the bi-lateral relationship advances from here! Best, Jake
Hello Jacob!
Sorry for replying late but the website has given me issues as hitting “Submit” makes my browsers want to download a PHP file. :\
“While I think extreme comparisons to imperialism and neocolonialism are a stretch, there is one key point on which I am in total agreement with you.”
I used these two terms on purpose to demonstrate just how emotional the debate about all things military usually gets here in Germany. The reason is both simple and utterly complicated: Many people look at the Basic Law, how it was created and especially the spirit in which it was created and consider “Never again” to be much much broader in spectrum than merely “Never again National Socialism”. For many people it also means never again shall Germany play the geopolitical game of a great power and never again shall it be a “Warrior Nation” and utilize military force for anything but self-defense (in the strictest terms one can think of). This touches a central pillar of the german self-perception, of our view on what our state and society should be and especially what it shouldn’t be. Many equate an active military (like the french is in Africa or the US is globally) as a sin against the spirit in which our constitution was written. Which is why the debate is so darn near impossible to start in the first place – many people consider that basic view of ourselves a societal achievement and are simply not prepared to let go of it – as it would (in that view) mean stepping back down the civilizational ladder and into the depths of the old follies that caused us and those around us so much trouble.
Which is also why I am not convinced that any foreign country – and least of all the US – should play a role in this debate at all lest it would be perceived as foreign pressure which may lead to a hardening of domestic attitudes here and even less room to wriggle for the political body.
Mike, great questions! I think you’ve hit the nail on the proverbial head regarding NATO as a platform to implement the transition. In a limited way, this is already occurring. For example, a German admiral led the task force to assist in monitoring refugee flows in the Aegean and the subsequent treaty enforcement between the EU and Turkey. Part of the problem lies in perceptions that remain antiquated and unhelpful. Can you imagine, for example, German troops conducting activities such as Operation Atlantic Resolve, where they act as a forward deployed presence and deterrent? We’re a long way off from that type of arrangement. But as time progresses, I think people will realize that military capabilities must be further developed. Look at Japan–there’s no question that the US will remain closely involved as a major security partner. But we’re now seeing parliamentary legislation allowing for deployments and “offensive” actions that were unthinkable just several years ago. Washington has been a major of supporter for lifting these limitations on the JSDF. The US could make the same types of encouraging overtures to Germany in this regard. But if US-German relations can’t move past the unhelpful name-calling, we can’t even begin to implement major policy shifts. Let’s hope cooler heads will prevail. Best, Jake
Sorry if you perceived my reply as a bit aggressive. It was not intended as such.
I have just seen the perspective of “geopolitical realism” being applied to Germany without any apparent knowledge of the country, its people and its mentality. Which is then usually followed by laments, accusations and use of lame stereotypes … simply because of the insufficient knowledge of key characteristics of german mentality, political and social culture. But don’t worry – that is a weakness even hard-boiled ThinkTankers and foreign policy wonks with long years of practice have not managed (or attempted) to get rid of. 😉
No you make a good point – questions on “Would X work for Germany” should be directed to Germans, not to Americans. Certainly there are exceptions based on experiences and expertise, but that’s typically how dialogue should be carried out. -Mike
Mike, absolutely. I think that’s what the essence of any future special relationship is about. It’s a mutual realization that the US and Germany have vested interests in closer cooperation in defense and many other realms. What this can’t be is a “Germany should do this” type of approach. The US gains no ground by lecturing and shaming–especially when it has made its share of mistakes. I think this is why today’s negative perceptions of transatlantic relations carry some larger consequences. The fact we are all having these discussions is great–what’s missing is the “man on the street” view of the relationship and its value. Best, Jake
Major Sotiriadis, thank you for your article. After reading your piece, I have two questions.
First, you discuss the potential of support and intelligence cooperation between the United States and Germany. I am curious whether you have any thoughts on the possible collaboration between Germany and the United States in developing stability operations capability. The United States looked to many European allies as it continued to build its civil society capability over the past two decades. With the military’s mission increasingly focused on these types of operations–especially given the beneficial downstream effects of successful civil society building and disastrous effects otherwise–how do you see Germany and the United States collaborating?
Second, you discussed the cooperation in intelligence sharing (bringing Germany into the “Five Eyes”) as a way of managing Germany’s privacy laws and domestic public opinion of intelligence sharing. How do you see such results from a change in the intelligence relationship? My initial thought is that the domestic constraints would make Germany more reluctant to agree to such frameworks in the first instance, and any agreement could be met with skepticism by the public.
Hi, Shivan. Thanks for your questions. I think you raise some important points. Regarding the civil-affairs capability, there is no question the US should work with, and develop further, its efforts with Germany in this realm. As a matter of fact, this is one area in which little controversy would be generated within Germany itself. But essentially, such an investment represents more of the same–a continuation of the status quo. I think that if the US elevated its relationship with Germany towards the model it has operated on with the UK in the past, we’d see some real changes. To be sure, much of the US/UK relationship rests on linguistic similarities, shared histories, etc….but there’s no question that ample building blocks exist upon which to construct the US/German special relationship. As I’ve mentioned before, I think the defense relationship is a good area to start, because it represents a broad commitment by both countries to own a shared stake in maintaining the international order. I share your opinion that “selling” an intelligence sharing expansion to the German public represents an initial challenge. However, in the wake of the December attack in Berlin, we are seeing much more legislation regarding surveillance activities move through the Bundestag. I think that the German public’s opinion is also shifting on this issue, as it becomes clearer and clearer that close intelligence cooperation with partner country agencies is a must to combat this problem. We’re in a bit of a transition period right now through the September elections in Germany. Once things are solidified from the results, we’ll begin to see which direction the country will take regarding future security and intelligence policy. Thanks, Jake
Major Sotiriadis, thank you for your very interesting article. As also could be seen in some of the comments, defence and security policy is a highly sensitive matter in Germany, due to Germany’s history. Additionally, large parts of the German public (especially on the left) over the years have been very critical of the USA’s military engagements. So if the USA wants greater commitment of Germany in the field of security politics, it has to take these deep rooted sensitivities into account and has to respect them. Shoving Germany around on the world stage like President Trump has done in recent time in regard to the NATO defence spending target, will only achieve greater reluctance on the part of Germany. This is especially unwise, as the dynamic threats to security and stability in Germany and the USA, indeed can not be fought by a single nation alone. Thus, the USA has to seriously improve its communications, if it really wishes to have enhanced cooperation with Germany. Upgrading the relationship to a “special relationship” and having more integrated missions in which Germany takes over the lead on certain aspects is indeed a very wise idea. However, I would also like to point out, that (also due to its history) Germany is very careful to coordinate its foreign and security policies with France. This also has to be taken into account by the US, if it wants to have closer cooperation with Germany on security affairs. If the USA and Germany establish a special relationship, it must not appear, as if Germany establishes itself as the sole power in Europe. This would put the French-German unity and with that the unity in the EU at risk. Accordingly, I would tend to propose, that a French-German-US alliance should be upgraded to being a “special relationship”. What do you think?
Moritz, I appreciate your insightful comments. First, let me say that I could not agree with you more about striking a positive tone between the two countries. Publicly shaming one’s allies due to policy differences is hardly a good way to make in-roads, much less forge increased levels of cooperation. At the same time, if the current administration had not emphasized military spending in NATO, would we even be having these discussions at all? I think the answer lies in a balanced approach, founded upon mutual respect for each other’s strengths. Ultimately, a special relationship encompasses social, economic, and cultural ties, as well as a security dimension. I suggest the security element as an area for development, as both countries have vested interests in rightsizing a future structure. While I agree with your suggestion to include France in principle, I don’t think it would be realistic. There are too many disagreements over security policy between the two countries that it might actually lead to an ineffective solution. Germany’s overall policy influence overshadows France’s on a global level as well, hence my original position about a US-German special relationship. This does not suggest ignoring the EU as an entity, but rather accounting for centers of power and maximizing cooperation. Thanks! -Jake
Major Sotiriadis,
I do agree that it is vital to look beyond the media rhetoric and seek to find a common ground between the two countries. As to your comment regarding the lack of Britain’s role in “anti-ISIL efforts,” I would kindly counter that they have a great many resources focused on this effort. RUSI, mass surveillance, NaCTSO – all dedicated resources with the objective of working to defeat extremist attacks. Having suffered very much from terrorist attacks (esp. recently), I expect these efforts will continue to intensify. You bring up a good point on the challenges facing the US and Germany regarding surveillance sharing – a challenge to all democracies walking a fine line between privacy and security – and a great suggestion to include Germany in the “Five Eyes” framework.
I believe that due to the strong American presence already in Germany, it would hopefully be possible to continue to build a relationship of mutual understanding between the two countries for increased information sharing and better diplomatic ties.
Hi, Brandy. Thanks for sharing your thoughts and great questions! Regarding your point on the UK, I’m more concerned with the broader picture of the UK’s role. In no way do I suggest the US diminish its relationship with the UK. It’s just that Germany is the natural power broker when one examines the totality of the situation. While UK forces have conducted more airstrikes against ISIL, let’s look at the entire picture. Nearly 900 Bundeswehr personnel serve in Afghanistan at present, the largest non-US contingent. On Ukraine, Angela Merkel has proven to be the critical interlocutor between the West and Russia, not her counterparts in the UK or France. Germany outfitted the first non-US aircraft capable of transporting Ebola patients and pledged more than 100 million Euros to combat the epidemic. A German admiral will soon led NATO’s naval presence in the Aegean to monitor the status of refugee flows.
The UK now significantly lacks power projection capabilities; it’s new position of “outside looking in” to the EU only weakens its international standing. Germany has lacked the will to engage abroad, but now possesses the latent power to surpass any European competitor, if desired. The extent to which Berlin can enact a transformational defense strategy depends partly on Washington’s willingness to embolden Germany. It’s simply a matter of relationships being subject to shifting dynamics in the international system. Thanks! -Jake
Jacob,
Thank you for the thorough response! Your data seems to strengthen against the argument that Germany has lacked the will to engage abroad…as it seems to be leading the way in many of these endeavors. I strongly agree with you that US leadership can embolden Germany to take the lead on a defense strategy for Europe and this could be implemented by finding common ground in security and defense issues (to begin). Both the US and Germany should also seek to posture themselves in a way that would invite dialogue in addressing solutions to many challenges they face in parallel.
Best,
Brandy
Dear Brandy!
“Your data seems to strengthen against the argument that Germany has lacked the will to engage abroad …”
Basically Germany has reacted to foreign pressure with “token deployments”, of late mostly of the training or mentoring type. There is no political will for a “true” combat deployment as politics is very careful not to test the limits of societal indifference (and patience) to such deployments and is very careful to design mandates to what is believed to the society will tolerate (or not really care about). Combat missions, on the other hand, are indeed a very hot political potatoe which no party wants on its plate at any time, especially not in an election year.
Hi, Christian. I certainly won’t speak for Brandy and allow her to respond accordingly. However, I think we’re confusing capability development and “combat” deployments, as you frame them. The two are not mutually exclusive. For example, we could examine the Luftwaffe’s lack of a strategic airlift capability, which serves both military and civilian purposes, or the integration/procurement of more remotely piloted vehicles, which again serve dual-purpose missions. These could be areas in which Germany invests, develops, and takes the lead within the alliance construct. How, when, and where Germany decides to subsequently employ its forces remains a decidedly German decision. But the US and Germany could partner further on such initiatives and extend this partnership into personnel exchanges, industry participation, and even linguistic initiatives on both sides. Best, Jake
(For some reason there is no “Reply” Link under your latest post, Jacob so I apologize for having to reply to my own post).
Hi Jacob!
As Clausewitz already deduced military capabilities are always a means to achieve certain political goals (his well-known “War is a continuation of policies by other means”). Which means I cannot really agree with you on separating military capabilities from political realities, intentions or cultures because the former are always an expression of the latter group. For example West Germany was constitutionally barred from having the Bundeswehr operate “out of country” – hence there were zero power projection capabilities. Today it still lacks such capabilities (beyond some very small tokenistic ones) because those 4 decades (and the preceding era of world wars) have created an inward-looking and borderline isolationist culture that doesn’t see “squabbles in countries far away among people of whom we know nothing” as “our problem” or “our responsibility” in the first place. Meaning procuring expensive military capabilities is always connected to the political and social culture of a country, a country which is mostly focused on itself will have a hard time developing long-range naval power projection capabilities and also will have trouble justifying expenses for strategic air transport to a constituency which would rather see that money being spent on “their” issues.
Hi Christian,
I saw that you are a Clausewitz fan! In reference to Clausewitz, “Pursue one great decisive aim with force and determination.” Combining the strengths of US and German defense capabilities in the way suggested by Jake would certainly indicate a stronger aim and determination than isolated actions from individual countries. Utilizing each others unique strengths has the potential to leverage the effectiveness of the combined resources.
Best,
Brandy
Good morning Brandy!
Yes, but Clausewitz also cautioned against overestimating the congruence of interests in alliances as only those partners directly affected will pursue a goal and put real resources into that while others (less or not really affected) will try to preserve the alliance but won’t go much beyond that, either. Afghanistan may serve as the near-perfect example for that.
The interests of the US and the interests of Germany may be parallel or even congruent in a lot of areas, but the political cultures are very different and also mean that the focus is different and the means used to pursue interests differ, too. As such the likelyhood of diverging interests (and willingness to use certain means to pursue them) is rather high …
Hi Jake,
could you elaborate on how exactly the US could encourage a greater role for the German Ministry of Defense? Particularly, in light of the high staff turnover at the head of the German Ministry of Defense (being defense minister is often compared with sitting on an ejection seat). Additionally, I would like to hear your thoughts on the framework nation concept that has been proposed by Germany. As you might be aware the concept stipulates that the smaller members of NATO specialize on certain capabilities and integrate themselves into the armies of the larger members which take responsibility for coordinating the contributions of the smaller partners. For instance, 2/3 of Dutch army brigades are now under overall German command and more recently Czechia and Romania have also subordinated units to the Bundeswehr.
Hi, Michael. Thanks for your questions. To your first point–I think it’s fairly well understood that the post-WWII German government structure intentionally weakened the Ministry of Defense to ensure that its influence would be inconsequential vis-a-vis other institutions. That may have made sense (to a point) at that time, but has carried some serious consequences in terms of fostering strategic thinking. In a sense, we have the opposite of the US model in Germany. Where in the US, the Defense Department carries a significantly larger budget and often dominates even some diplomatic initiatives, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is more influential in terms of German foreign policy and military debates. The Ministry of Defense has essentially been left to work procurement, training, and acquisition-related portfolios. The US can encourage, through dialogue and military/diplomatic exchanges, the German government to perhaps gradually adopt a more collectivist approach to defense policy. There are certainly valid inputs that come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, policy derived from subject matter experts is a valuable commodity. Many senior German officers have now returned from Afghanistan with combat experience as well as leadership credentials in running complicated, multi-national organizations. This experience is easily perishable and should be valued and incorporated within the broader internal policy debates. Regarding the framework nation concept–this is a great opportunity to foster further integration and cooperation among European armed forces. There’s no question that interoperability and training only improve through rigorous coordination and effort. While this is a good effort, the bigger picture is that capabilities are still quite disproportionally distributed among NATO members. It’s no surprise that the US leads in this regard. What I am proposing is a more fundamental redistribution of key mission sets within NATO, and specifically between the US and Germany. A gradual approach of transferring key support roles would help German officials make the case for increased defense expenditures while balancing a politically sensitive issue. As I’ve mentioned before, this would be a first step towards a more comprehensive relationship to be forged between the two countries. Do you think the German public would be more malleable to a gradualist approach? Thanks, Jake
Hi Jake,
I believe taking a gradualist approach is the only viable course of action. Both to convince the German public of the need for increased military spending as well as to ensure that any spending increase is part of a long-term plan to systematically enhance the capabilities of the German armed forces as opposed to just being a means of reaching the 2% threshold. However, do you believe that there is enough patience for such a gradual approach within the US government? Particularly, in light of the growing resentment within the US population over the unequal distribution of defense spending in NATO.