The Brussels Plan is the honest and holistic approach to induce new life and vision into the transatlantic community. First and foremost, it acknowledges the critical importance of a unified transatlantic relations: we are stronger with allies. Its name is a statement that the European ideals still have much to offer and assures us that we can all prosper in diversity. However, it is now on the Europeans to ensure the innovation and modernization of this alliance. The plan does not deny the internal contradictions and the imperfection of our democratic systems. Instead, it applies the lessons-learned about societal inequality, an emerging new nationalism, and European democratic participation. It comes at a critical moment when not only the future of the European Union is at stake, but when this community experiences a resurgent threat of Russian power ambitions, first signs of the return of Ottoman dreams and the absence of American leadership.
History has shown that multilateral and strategic cooperation works. With the Marshall Plan, the US had realized that switching back into isolationism would not work. The US reached out to our devastated continent and helped us to create the living proof of multilateralism – the European Union. Not only did this long-term oriented approach guarantee peace in Europe, it also made the transatlantic community the most prosperous region on the face of this earth. To maintain this success, our leaders need to seek open discussions with the public to convince them of the importance of the transatlantic project. If we fail to coordinate, if we allow a policy vacuum, we compel China and Russia to increase their spheres of influence. Even if we can’t agree on details, even if everything is up for renegotiation, then we should nevertheless all subscribe to this: we are stronger together! Diversity of culture, perspective and interest are the very principles that define our great democracies as most resilient and legitimized systems. In times of populism and neo-nationalist tendencies, shying away from the task to promote these principles on the international stage is tempting but would betray the very values every member of the transatlantic community has engrained in their fabric. Shying away from the transatlantic community is not an option. Therefore, the Brussels Plan proposes three steps of public engagement that need to be translated into visionary messages and local activism:
- It needs to be acknowledged that our European problems are interconnected with the transatlantic project. The future of the transatlantic community, of the international system, is based on a strong and stable Europe. Fundamental reforms of the European Parliament, a convincing Brexit result, and solutions to the youth unemployment pandemic are crucial foundations of the Brussels Plan. With the help of a renewed Franco-German engine of European reform and integration, we need to promote comprehensive vision and positive action for Europe.
- We need to raise awareness what it would mean to turn our back on the transatlantic community. Our societies need to debate what our alternatives are. Do we believe in Chinese trade cooperation? Should we sacrifice Ukraine and the Baltics to profit from the business opportunities with Russia? The public needs to appreciate that our partnerships are complex, more than financially incentivized, and diverse in their benefits. Next to big picture analyses, local townships should assess and communicate what each partner means for their regional welfare.
- Finally, the plan is a clear commitment that Europe, the US, and Canada are, with all their flaws and controversies, still the best partners. We need to refrain from easy criticism of individual governments and should instead look at our shared history and our common liberal values. The trends of globalization can only be guided and mitigated, not reversed. We want to remain in the driver seat of globalization. Thus, we should strengthen citizen diplomacy, historic contextualization and cultural exchanges to overcome stereotypes and foster mutual understanding.
The Brussels Plan reaches out to our friends and proposes specific fields where we should advance our relationship.
- Improve Burden-Sharing: sending a signal of determination and responsibility, the European countries will proceed with their own defense coordination, while they accommodate US demands for greater burden sharing. Next to a detailed plan to meet the 2% NATO goal by 2024, NATO members will develop a burden sharing score which appreciates the diversity of contributions. Focusing first on defense cooperation and coordination in the transatlantic alliance combines the need to create a new momentum within European integration, the countering of vital threats to some of our members, and sends a strong signal to the United States that Europe can be a credible leader of our alliance.
- Bridging the Atlantic: we have to utilize technology for greater transatlantic exchange in education and workforce training. Erasmus in mind, we can reach over the Atlantic to share best practices in vocational training and to create a transatlantic curriculum that fosters mutual understanding. While this is a long-term oriented measure, it is, if adequately funded and promoted, a great demonstration of mutual determination that will improve the reciprocal perception of each participating country.
- Free Trade: we need to embrace one of our most important principles. Since TTIP faces highly mobilized opponents in civil society, we need to see its current stagnation as a chance for renewal. After a period of honest and more transparent engagements with grass-root organizations, we should aim for a TTIP-light version. It is imperative to agree to a balanced and fair free trade agreement to counter the protectionist voices that are creeping into our economies.
- Technology for the Principle of Subsidiarity: to spark new enthusiasm for our transatlantic partnership, we need to utilize new channels of exchange and trust building. Technology enables us to strengthen local ties between municipalities and cities. The direct cultural exchange and sharing of best business practices will empower the people to believe in a common future. Furthermore, in times of disagreement on the state level, it will lay the ground for continued cooperation in issues of climate change or integrational policies.
In times of uncertainty and crises, the Brussels Plan is the European answer to inspire the renewal of the transatlantic relationship. Driven by the conviction that we are stronger together, this plan lays the groundwork for a strategic narrative for the new era. It highlights the alternatives to the transatlantic partnership, utilizes the European experience in overcoming dissent and tasks the European members with concrete actions to fight for the modernization of our transatlantic community.
Hi Paul,
Thank you for sharing your ideas. I agree with you: Even considering all problems and differences, Europe, the US, and Canada are natural partners and should work together. I have two questions regarding the proposed Brussels Plan: First of all, if I understand the plan correctly, it is an action plan addressing the European Union. So what is the role of the US in your plan? And how should the EU react, if the current US administration rejects new initiatives like TTIP light?
cheers
Justus
Hi Justus,
Thanks for getting back to me so quickly. The Brussels Plan is supposed to be a strategic narrative that combines the results of the previous expedition, emphasizing Europes role to take the initiative. In that regard you are right, it is written from a European perspective. With the transatlantic relations at an inflection point, it is crucial that the EU now takes the lead to modernize and innovate our ties with the US. With the current US administration perceiving international relations mostly as zero sum game (https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-first-doesnt-mean-america-alone-1496187426), Europe needs to revive the multilateral spirit that gave us more than 70 years of peace. Thus, the Brussel Plan borrows from the visionary success of the Marshall Plan (vision is often absent in the current European discourse) and appeals to one of the greatest successes of the United States. It is an European offer to take the initiative. Just like the Marshall Plan, it can not be a top down approach. Instead it is a suggestion and a proof of effort not to give up on this special relationship.
As for now, there is nothing much we can do if the US, or any other partner, refuses to take part of this renewal. In fact, especially with TTIP in Germany, it is not even clear whether that can be the way forward or whether it would fail again. What counts is that we pick up the pieces of previous attempts and use them to either fix previous ones or to create something entirely new. It should not mean that we get bullied in renegotiated deals that only shifted one-sidedly, but that we take our lessons learned seriously. Learning from previous mistakes, from the legitimate criticism expressed, we have to improve the output legitimacy of our democracies. Just walking away from these things would not help anyone.
Having that said, I understand that such a big transatlantic plan takes time. I also referred to some measures that would hardly be felt within the next couple of years. While we might not be able to forge new, innovative and cooperative ties right now, we might be able to do so in a couple of years. And once the current climate of purely interest driven and passionless transactions has vanished, it would be great to have a comprehensive program (as developed by the Atlantic expedition) ready.
Hi Paul! Thank you for your article. Would you mind elaborating a bit on the burden sharing score? How would this score be calculated to satisfy the different parties? I defnitely like the idea, so I am curious to understand better how you would design it. Thanks again and best wishes, Felicitas
Hi Felicitas,
Thank you for taking the time to read and comment on my article.
I think the score, as proposed by the previous expedition´s defense working group, fulfills at least two functions to satisfy the American claims and Eastern European fears, and to improve the overall abilities of NATO: most importantly, a score would allow to better reflect the reality of todays military security challenges. Think about merging the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Federal Ministry of Defense under a broader structure that enables greater strategic coordination and an emphasis on prevention. While deterrence and a potential readiness are crucial factors for collective security, especially with recent developments at the Eastern boarders of NATO, it won’t be enough to invest in better military capabilities to counter the bandwidth of complex conflicts. NATO should be able to address – and appreciate – this. If we are truly committed to finding better answers to today´s conflicts, we need to allow a broader security definition to shape our alliance. The score should allow countries to prove their determination and commitment by taking conflict prevention activities, specific aspects of developmental work, and other expenses that are not part of the military as such (thus currently not part of the 2% GDP goal), but that can be directly linked to the physical security of the member states. To summarize this point, the score is a response to an oversimplified view that more defense spending would automatically mean better defense policy outputs or more security. […]
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Secondly, the score allows more NATO members to demonstrate their various contributions to the collective security alliance contribute to the military alliances . Although European countries have long enjoyed a peace divided in terms of hard military power, that should not be easily interpreted as lack of determination or commitment. While there are definitely several short comings in terms of German or European capabilities (and capability coordination), more military spending would not directly translate into greater operational readiness of each individual country. It always needs to be combined with greater European defense integration. If that is the case, why don’t we address the military capabilities through this effort and satisfy our formal and public NATO commitment in ways that could actually be useful to the overall purpose of the alliance?
The score is a compromise that allows to follow suit with US calls for more European engagement but also a chance to improve the overall quality and strategic perspective of NATO.
Hi Paul, thanks for elaborating on it. Makes sense! Curious to see how this topic will be moved on or not… Best, Felicitas
Dear Paul,
your plan addresses the right issues. I agree with your idea that Europe needs to step up its game and take a more active role in shaping the transatlantic relationship. I particularly like your point that we need raise awareness in regard to what alternatives there are to partner with the US. And while you do mention that Europe and the US have their flaws, somwhat similar to Churchill’s famous quote about democracy, I’d be curious to hear from you, which other motivator you see besides ‘the lesser of evils’. I’m asking because I think a lot of people don’t are of the opinion that partnering with others than the US would be that bad. Thanks.
Hi Guido,
Thanks for reaching out! I am not saying that democracy is a bad form of government or that we necessarily should frame this issue as “the lesser of evils”. That would be a tough sell, especially if such a Brussels Plan would mark a departure into a more positive, visionary future. Actually, we should emphasize the opposite. As, among others, @katharina-ramsauer pointed out, we are bound by a certain set of positive values. Furthermore, the past of the transatlantic community is a historic blueprint for successful cooperation that can hardly be matched by any other region.
Having that said, I meant that we need to be honest about our current short comings. We will not ignite passion for something that only produced negative headlines in the recent past. While a proper communication strategy might also be part of the solution, we need to start to actually deliver better results. Consulting the will of the people beyond our electoral turns, trying to gather subsidiary support for a renewed alliance, Europe´s countries (as well as the US and Canada) need to make an honest assessment of the alternatives. I admit that I phrased it rather negatively in the text, but I am convinced that we need to trust the transatlantic cooperation to ultimately prove organically that it is the better alternative. Let people argue why, where and for how long China might be the better partner. Let us engage in meaningful and further cooperation with other partners. Let us have these discussions. However, let us also not forget about the opportunities and benefits we find right at our doorstep (the Atlantic) just because we were hit by several crises and a poisoned political climate.
In that context, I can think of these additional “motivators”: track record (whether we like it or not, the transatlantic region got very rich and peaceful through the past cooperation), values, trust (we developed quite a “stickiness” and mutual understanding over the decades; due to lacking experience and cultural differences, that might be more difficult with e.g. China), individual experiences and exchanges (the interconnectedness of individuals who emigrated, traveled, learned a language etc), NATO.
I am looking forward to hear your thoughts on this as well!
Thanks for your reply Paul. I think especially the question of common values is an important one. Especially the generation that has no memory of the time when Germany and the US weren’t allies has a hard time, I think, seeing the benefits of the partnership because they have always been there. However, I would argue, most of the younger generation, especially in Germany, has an ambivalent opinion about the common values with the US. I think in particular the response after 9/11 and the election of Trump made a lot of people in Germany wonder if we really share the same values. While I agree that there is common liberal basis, there needs to be broader, more open, more inclusive, and discussion about the common values and, what I think is even more important, we must act according to these values in order to regain trust and maintain legitimacy.
Hi Guido,
I agree. The perceived trustworthiness of the US is declining to new lows (see data from 2016 https://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2016/april/ and 2017 https://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2017/juni/). I think you touched on the issue of trust and credibility again. How can we define ourselves as value based community if our actions can be so easily criticized as anti democratic, pro big banks, pro interventionist, anti immigration, anti social state etc. To be able to get back to the discussion about the common values, we need to “fix (read improve) our systems”.
Paul,
I enjoyed reading this policy article and I first want to establish that I agree with the conclusion. Transatlantic states ought to adopt the Brussels plan. However, I do believe this plan ignores inherent problems that are already in place in regards to sharing of various resources states already have.
Currently, we understand that some states are more populist than others for example the UK has a far different outlook on immigration and even the E.U. Germany, who allowed over 1 million immigrants to enter the nation between 2015-2016. This dissent and difference in how states view immigration and economic’s have lead to different opinions on the utility of trade agreements and intelligence sharing for the purposes of security.
What can states do now to regain trust, and to share intelligence effectively when they have different outlooks on the causes of terrorism and economic competition via globalization? How can we offer incentives to nations like the UK who believe the EU is becoming a detriment to their economy? While I disagree with these sentiments it is a popular one, and one I certainly feel ought to be addressed.
Hi Jalon,
thanks for reading the article!
Bottom Line Up Front: we dont necessarily need to offer incentives because disargeement is natural, only a symptom and not the cause and finally, there is still enough room to cooperate. If pressed to hard, we have to agree to disagree but should always leave the doors open for further talks.
You are right, the different positions pose a great problem and you are highlighting an issue at the core of the problem. In a way, these differences are the reason why a renewal of the relations seems necessary in the first place. Where is disagree with you however, is that the populist sentiments and the fundamental differences (I assume we all agree that some disagreement is even desirable and absolutely normal), are the very root of the problem. Instead, I see most causes that brought us Brexit and other populist results originating in the inability of our current systems to produce the necessary amount of output legitimacy. That is the actual and collective cause of many problems that caused the frictions on the international level. The Brussels Plan, without getting into more details, touched on this in its first point to increase public engagement. We can only overcome fundamental differences and populism if we improve and reform our systems.
Beyond that, we were always able to seek common ground despite disagreeing on many issues. Compromises are part of the solution. That holds true for disagreements in the fields of economics, migration or intelligence sharing. I don’t see how the differences you mentioned block off every form of possible corporation. There is luckily no European state yet where a form of intelligence sharing seems entirely immoral or reckless. We could immediately begin working on greater integration here and I think other countries would be ready to do so as well (depending on the level of integration). However, if corporation seems entirely impossible, I tend to believe that some countries should be allowed to progress with their own policies in a certain direction instead of having to wait for the entire group to follow (e.g. two-speeds & the Franco-German engine). That enables new space for bitterly needed reforms and overcomes the risk of being constantly blockaded.
Hi Paul,
I mirror many of the sentiments already brought up in the other comments, so
instead I have a short question: You mention that you feel it to be more worthwhile to refrain from easy criticism of individual governments and instead to focus on strengthening “citizen diplomacy.” As a ‘soft power’ tool of diplomacy, as I understood it, I am curious about how you envision citizen diplomacy to work and/or establish itself as a motor of further transatlantic integration. Thanks 🙂
Hi Christin,
thanks for your comment. I do not see citizen diplomacy and individual criticism of governments as mutual exclusive. It should definitely be possible to address governments if they are on the wrong track. However, the question is how far that carries us if we blame each other at the highest level all the time. From an European perspective, it currently appears to be too easy to criticize President Trump for example. Beyond legitimately calling bad politics out, it can easily tip over to more (also unjustified) anti American sentiments that would hurt the alliance beyond repair.
Instead of being stuck in settings like G-20, we need to be more proactive. I see citizen diplomacy as one underutilized tool among many (so it must not be the only and most crucial driver for future integration). It should emphasize the subsidiary perspective. Politics is also done at the lowest, the individual level of each citizen and not only by a distant political elite. Everyone might have a certain responsibility to engage with transatlantic issues, other cultures and contextual conditions. I would like to see greater exchange between the transatlantic community where people are actively trying to understand the other side, as well as they try to present and argue their own national agenda.
Overall, that would strengthen the informal bonds and mutual understanding. I see that concept closely linked with for example a stronger effort for sister cities. Citizen diplomacy is part of a grass root effort that emboldens the municipal level and individual connections to counter/substitute the inefficiency and structural inability of current top level of international politics.
Paul, I like your idea about a new Brussels Plan. It reminded me of the speech Sigmar Gabriel gave in Washington DC during his visit in May: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2017/170518-BM_Marshall-Plan_70.html
At the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, the German Foreign minister repeated the US policymaking community in DC that the Marshall Plan had nothing to do with altruism, but was a policy the U.S. adopted in pursuit of its own interests. Sigmar Gabriel also explained the German approach regarding defense spending, highlighting that “more military spending will not automatically bring about more security and more peace”. Your proposed burden sharing score clearly reflects this perspective. Similarly to your article, Gabriel also referred to the role of China and the fact that if Europe and the US don’t join hands, China will fill the vacuum.
Thus, it seems that the German government would have no difficulties supporting the new Brussels Plan. I would be interested to know more about the implementation of the Brussels Plan. As a European initiative, who should take the lead? Only the EU or both the EU and single member states? Having worked in Brussels, I have witnessed the difficulties related to the coordination between different EU institutions. Do you think the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini should be responsible for the implementation of the Brussels Plan? If so, do you think there are synergies between the Brussels Plan and the EU’s Global Strategy: http://europa.eu/globalstrategy ?
Hi Anna,
You definitely hit the right point with Gabriels speech (I had the opportunity to listen to him at CSIS). Your questions about the implementation are crucial.
I am kind of split between leaving this initiative entirely to the EU institutions and using their resources to initiative national actions (after all, most action is required at the smallest level). I could also envision a core group of countries advancing with the proposal and then having the EU to provide Europe-wide incentives to implement successful strategies in more countries. On the other hand, it would be a signal of weakness if the EU would leave such an approach to the member states. Without me being more specific at this point, I think the EEAS should at least take a major role either to communicate and coordinate either the EU or the European country measurements.
Regarding the Global Strategy, it seems complementary. The Brussels Plan directly aligns with the overall message of #StrongerWithAllies. Good and renewed transatlantic relations are essential for the Security of the EU, and the call for modernized multilateralism is an innovative take on the cooperative regional orders the strategy calls for.
Please let me know how you think about it, since you might have a more hands on understanding about the current European bureaucratic capabilities. Would you tie it to some member states or involve the whole EU from day one?